Foreword: A Primer for Free
issues on intellectual property: e.g., the extension of patents to software and
business models, the lengthening of copyright protection, the compulsory licensing
of pharmaceutical products or the legal suits against music downloaders.
Economics is also a powerful instrument to improve public policy. It helps
to design the appropriate reform to adapt intellectual property law to the 21st
century.
That is why we wrote this book and decided to deliver it for free.
Our aim is not to defend an opinion _ otherwise we would have written an
essay or a manifesto instead of a textbook. We want to shed the light of economic
analysis on major patent and copyright issues and, therefore, help our readers to
make up their own minds. We thus describe and discuss the rationale of intellectual
property law, its economic advantages and drawbacks and how to fine-tune them.
Consistent with this approach, the book has been written to reach a wide public of
both economists and non economist readers. In particular, it should also help
lawyers, engineers and scientists to become more familiar with economic analysis
of intellectual property.
We have chosen to use the internet to share our conviction on usefulness of
economics to the larger number of people. As we argue in one of our chapters, the
development of the world-wide-web along with the digitalization of contents - text,
music, or video - have opened new possibilities of diffusion which we have decided
to experience with this book. Virtual books, as any digital content, can be copied
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Economics is a powerful instrument to understand the current controversial

and transmitted nearly for free. This may be a nightmare for those authors and
producers who lose the economic incentives to invest in new creations. This may
also be a unique opportunity for those _ like us _ whose prime aim is to diffuse
knowledge and information.
In return for free access to this book, we expect two benefits: useful feedback
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and further diffusion. A digital book can easily be updated and evolve as readers
express

new

needs.

We

will

thus

welcome

any

suggestion

(to

meniere@cerna.ensmp.fr) that would be worth adding to the book. We especially
encourage graduate students and instructors using this textbook to suggest
addenda and exercises. We also encourage you to post the weblink to our book
(www.cerna.ensmp.fr/PrimerForFree.html) on your website. This is exactly how
the internet is useful! So enjoy the reading, and please diffuse this book!

François Lévêque
Yann Ménière

Paris, July 2004

Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.
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Should intellectual property protection be tightened or relaxed?
Should we side with Kazaa, which fled to Vanuatu to set up shop, or the major
record labels that had Napster wound up? Should computer programs be
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Introduction
organization.
This book is nevertheless intended for non-economists, particularly
law students. It has been designed with them in mind, by alternating general
sections with more detailed analysis, and by providing the description of
models in insets separate from the main text.
At the same time, the economic analysis offers readers with
no legal knowledge a basis for understanding intellectual property law.
Intellectual property encompasses different types of rights _ patents,

Introduction

copyrights and the sui generis rights that protect plant varieties,
semiconductor chips and databases. All these rights obey common economic
principles. This book seeks to outline these general principles and provide a
more detailed analysis of the specific features of copyrights and patents.
The book is comprised of five chapters. The first is an explanatory

1

chapter. It presents the basic economic ideas behind intellectual property to
Should intellectual property protection be tightened or relaxed?

the lay reader. It explains how temporary and exclusive intellectual property

Should I side with Kazaa, which fled to Vanuatu to set up shop, or the major

rights reflect the specific characteristics of information. It also describes how

record labels that had Napster wound up? Should computer programs be

the allocation of intellectual property rights facilitates trade and enables ideas

patentable, and should Microsoft be allowed not to disclose information on

and creations to be exploited by those that value them most.

window's interfaces, and either way jeopardize the development of freeware?

The second and third chapters deal with patents. Chapter 2 has a

Should pharmaceutical companies be compelled to license their products at

normative slant and Chapter 3 a positive one. Chapter 2 examines ways to

low price, or should they benefit from better protection to encourage them to

fine-tune patent scope in order to maximize welfare, by determining the

find new molecules?

optimal research effort, duration, breadth and depth of a patent. Chapter 3,

On the one hand, piracy and counterfeiting are spreading, which

on the reform and use of patents, offers readers a more tangible view of

reduces the incentives to create and invent. On the other hand, intellectual

intellectual property. It analyses and discusses the way in which patents have

property law is being reinforced, which will ultimately restrict the diffusion of

been strengthened, harmonized and extended to new categories of inventions

creative work and the use of innovations. What is the right balance?

and points up the consequences on innovation and the behavior of firms.

This book aims to show the contribution that economic analysis can
make to this debate.

The fourth chapter analyses copyright and its specific features. It first
presents the negative effects of piracy, which, according to economic theory,

Intellectual property is a recent field of study for economists. Most

justify the existence of copyright. It then looks at institutions based on

research in this area began in the 1960s and focused on patents and their

copyright. The chapter includes descriptive sections, which illustrate the

contribution to technological progress. Since then, the study of intellectual

theoretical explanations of copyright and outline the questions copyright

property has gradually expanded beyond the circle of innovation specialists.

raises today.

Economists from all horizons are now taking an interest in the subject. The

The fifth chapter looks at the interface between intellectual property

overview proposed in this book therefore covers a wide variety of economic

law and competition law. It covers both patents and copyright, and integrates

aspects. It includes ideas from antitrust economics and industrial

legal aspects. It first broaches the question from a general point of view, to

2
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determine whether the two bodies of law are contradictory or
complementary. It then emphasizes the anticompetitive effects of intellectual
property rights, through an examination of license agreements.
Readers will note that the book does not address trademark law.
Together with patents and copyright, trademarks are indeed an area of
intellectual property law. But law and economics diverge on their analysis.
For economists [Landes and Posner, 1987], trademarks respond to a different
problem than other intellectual property rights: they are a way of signaling
the quality of goods and services to consumers. The analytical tools used to
study trademarks are therefore quite different than those applied to other
forms of intellectual property. Trademark law has therefore been excluded
from this study.

3
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Intellectual Property Law

The authors have also made the deliberate choice of emphasizing the role of
intellectual property in facilitating trade and division of labor. By reducing

Intellectual property applies to all types of creative work. Through a

transaction costs, the legal system of protection for works of the intellect

system of exclusive and transferable rights, its legal framework protects

facilitates the exploitation of inventions and creations by those who value

trademarks, technical innovations, databases, literary works, musical

them most. This role is more often overlooked than that of providing
incentives to innovate. It is nevertheless as _ if not more _ essential from an

compositions, films and even plant varieties. Each of these categories is

economic viewpoint.

intellectual property law. From an economic perspective, intellectual

covered by specific legislation, which lawyers group under the heading of
property law responds to two requirements: to provide incentives for
innovators and to facilitate trade.

Striking a balance between incentive and access
Why does the law protect inventions and artistic works? The lawyer's
answer is that intellectual property law seeks to encourage innovation and
creation, while enabling access. This basic principle is highlighted by
economic analysis, which assimilates works of the intellect to the production
of information, although this presents two problems in terms of allocation of
resources [Arrow, 1962].
Firstly, information is a non-excludable good. This means that it is
impossible to exclude an individual from using the good even if he does not
contribute to the cost of producing it. For example, a publisher cannot stop
the same book from being loaned and read by several people. Similarly, a

4
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newspaper journalist cannot prevent an original piece of information she
reveals from being repeated by colleagues. The practical problem posed by
these goods is a lack of incentive for entrepreneurs to produce them. From the
outset, they know they will have difficulty being paid and covering their costs.
From the point of view of the community, there is a loss in welfare, because

I/The Basic Economics of Intellectual Property Law

Dynamic efficiency refers to the

winner. When the patent passes

improvement and renewal of pro-

into the public domain, the price

duction techniques and goods over

falls to p1 = c1 and the quantity
produced rises to q1 . The total
surplus increases by the area of

time. It is the result of investment
in R&D, design and creation.

goods for which there is a market will not be produced.
Secondly, information is a non-rival good. When an individual
consumes information, it does not reduce the quantity available to other
people. For example, watching a football game on television does not prevent
other viewers from consuming the same program. Non-rivalry can be seen as
the opposite of congestion. The enjoyment of watching a football game is not
diminished by the presence of a large number of other viewers around the

5

world. In other words, the marginal cost of serving an additional consumer is
zero. Consequently, when a producer charges for his service, consumption of
the good is needlessly rationed. Consumers whose willingness to pay is lower
than the going price are excluded from using the good, although they would
have benefited from it at no cost to anyone. Social welfare is not maximized.
By offering an exclusive right for a limited period, intellectual property
law addresses these two problems sequentially. Initially, the legal mechanism
of protection makes the good excludable. Users are required to pay for the
services offered, through royalties. Subsequently, when the work passes into
the public domain, all consumers can access it free of charge. Intellectual
property law thus attempts to strike a balance between the incentive to create
and innovate, and the diffusion of the results obtained. This contradiction
between incentive and use translates into economic language as a trade-off
between dynamic and static efficiency.

triangle III, because new consu-

effect of patent protection. The

mers have access to the good.

innovation here reduces the costs

Because of the reduction in price,

of a manufacturing process from

the consumer surplus increases

c0 to c1 . Before the invention, the
quantity of goods produced q0 is
sold at a price of p0 = c0. We

from area I to area (I + II + III)

assume a perfectly competitive

winners.

zero. Consumers are now the only

profit of zero. The total surplus is
therefore the consumer surplus,

6

During protection:
euros

equal to the area of triangle I.

D

During the lifetime of the patent,
the quantity of goods produced is

I

p0

c
II

always q0 and the price p0. But the

c1

total surplus has increased by the
area

of

rectangle

II,

which

0

q0

Q

represents the savings generated by
the innovation. This producer
surplus is appropriated by the
set at r = c0 - c1 per unit of output.
The other companies continue to

allocation of resources should

make zero profit because they

maximize surplus. Surplus consists
of producer profit _ measured by

receive revenue of p0 x q0 for
Similarly, the consumer surplus

attempts to strike a balance between

the area between the price and the
marginal cost _ and consumer gain

two economic efficiency objectives.

_ measured by the area between

To achieve static efficiency,

the demand curve and the price.

Intellectual property law

while the inventor's profit falls to

market and therefore a producer

inventor through license revenue,

By addressing the problems of non-excludability and non-rivalry of

Static efficiency versus
dynamic efficiency

The figure below shows the

expenditure of (c1 + r), i.e., p0q0 .
does not change. At this stage,
therefore, the inventor is the only

After protection expires
:
euros
D
p0

I

c
II

0

c1

III

p1
q0

q1
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To recapitulate: before the

arises there is that without the

invention, the total surplus is equal

protection phase, the invention will

to area I; during protection, it is

not be produced: since the inventor

equal to I + II; after the patent

knows that the market price will

expires, it is equal to I + II + III.

fall to P1 and he will not be able to

This means that society is better off

recover his R&D expenses, he

if an invention is produced, and

therefore has no incentive to make

even better off if the patent has

the investment.

expired. This suggests that it would

In other words, protection generates

be preferable to move straight from

a deadweight loss to society (area of

the invention phase to the public

triangle III), but this is the sacrifice

domain and bypass the protection

required to encourage artists and

phase. However, the problem that

inventors to make the effort.
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public good), the canonical economic prescription [Samuelson, 1954] is
subsidization. This mechanism involves reimbursing the company for its
expenditure _ which eliminates the deficit and therefore the problem of a lack
of incentive to produce _ and offering free access to the good or service _
which avoids the deadweight loss and therefore corrects the problem of suboptimal rationing. Examples of this solution, in which production is funded
by taxpayers rather than users, are national defense and urban street lighting.
In the arts, subsidization exists in the form of patronage, which has enabled
major works of art to be produced [Plant, 1934]. In the field of knowledge and
science, the equivalent is public research. Subsidization is implemented via
endowments to public facilities, bound to broad objectives (e.g., the multiyear funding contracts between the U.S. government and NASA) or via grants
to associations or companies contracted to produce according to precise
specifications (e.g., National Science Foundation and National Institutes of
Health). More rarely, prizes are awarded to individuals who develop a

information sequentially, patents and copyright are necessarily imperfect

particular innovation. An example of this is the reward Edward Jenner

mechanisms. During the period of protection, the rationing of consumption
generates a deadweight loss for society. Once a work passes into the public

received from the British parliament for developing a smallpox vaccine
[MacLeod, 1988]. In contrast, this solution is widespread in the artistic _

domain, the deadweight loss disappears, but the innovators lose their

particularly literary _ sphere. These awards are not only designed as an

royalties, which may prevent innovations of benefit to society from being

incentive for creators. They also play a role of quality indicator for consumers.

produced. Let us consider, for example, an invention with a cost of 70, a value

However, the subsidization alternative is not without shortcomings in

to society of 100, from which the company can derive annual revenue of 3 per

terms of both static and dynamic efficiency. Deadweight loss is eliminated at

year. The invention is socially useful because its value is higher than its cost.

the expense of taxation on other goods, which introduces distortions in other

However, if the property right lasts for 20 years, it is not profitable for the

compartments of the economy. In other words, public funding is not free.

company to make the corresponding investment in R&D. In other words, to

Furthermore, unless the government has accurate knowledge of the costs and

limit the problem of non-excludability, the period of legal protection must be

benefits of research, the amount of subsidies will be mismatched to the social

infinite, whereas to eliminate the problem of non-rivalry it must be zero.

value of the innovations. This means that research endowments or grants
tend to either under or overcompensate innovation.

Alternatives

A term-by-term comparison of exclusive rights and subsidization
[Gallini and Scotchmer, 2001] therefore does not enable us to say that one

If granting an exclusive right for a limited period is an imperfect

instrument is better than the other in the absolute. Their relative merits

mechanism, why use it? What alternative instruments exist? One is that

depend on circumstances, in particular on the information available to the

governments can fund artistic and technical works; and the other is that

government.

inventors can keep their discoveries secret.

Be that as it may, state intervention _ in the form of public funding or
even protection by intellectual property law _ is not always essential to

With a good that is both non-excludable and non-rival (this is a pure

8
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creation. Another possible strategy for firms is to use secrecy to protect a

literary sphere, although every book is unique, if the price of a book goes up,

process (e.g., Michelin radial tires) or formula (e.g., Coca Cola). As long as an

consumers will switch to a similar but cheaper alternative. Because of such

innovation is kept secret, it cannot be copied by competitors and the company

substitution, the market from the point of view of competition is usually

can appropriate the profits it generates. There is no need to introduce a

larger than the market for the work itself. Now let us look more closely at the

complex legal mechanism to address the problem of non-excludability, since

connection between exclusive rights and monopoly.

there is none! By definition, secrecy implies physical barriers to exclude free

Economic theory draws a distinction between drastic and nondrastic

riders. Conversely, even when kept secret, information is still a non-rival

innovations. In the case of a drastic innovation, intellectual property gives a

good. Not diffusing it generates a cost to society. Even if an innovation can be
protected by secrecy, a patent is valuable to society because of the disclosure

monopoly over the market, whereas in the case of a nondrastic innovation, it
simply gives market-power (or monopoly power _ the two terms are used

requirement it entails. In effect, patent law requires applicants to describe

interchangeably). A drastic innovation is one that reduces the cost of

their invention in sufficient detail for it to be reproduced by a skilled person

production or improves the quality of a product to such an extent that the new

or team. Once this information has been made public, it can be used by others

monopoly price is lower than the competitors' production cost. The company

to extend the frontiers of knowledge. Patents thus foster technical progress.

that holds the property right no longer has to worry about competition. It can

Inventors can also gain from opting for a patent instead of a trade secret

behave like a monopolist that seeks to maximize its profit without fearing

because a patent also protects against innovations realized independently. If

other entrants. Conversely, if the innovation is nondrastic, the innovator's

Michelin's radial tire process or the Coca Cola formula were to be developed

monopoly price remains higher than the competitors' cost. To exclude its

by an ingenious competitor, the corporations headquartered in Clermont-

rivals, the innovator must set a lower price than in the case of drastic

Ferrand and Atlanta would lose their exclusivity, whereas a patent would

innovation. Because this price is still higher than the marginal cost, however,

have protected them against such rival inventions.

the company enjoys market power, i.e., it can charge a higher price than the

Trade secrecy is obviously of no avail when the information created is

competitive price for a significant length of time.

incorporated into the new product on the market. This is typically the case of

To examine the link between intellectual property rights and

literary and artistic works, but also applies to animal breeds and plant

monopoly, we need to ask which market structure is most conducive to

varieties. Innovations in industrial techniques, such as semi conductor chips,

innovation: monopoly or perfect competition? This question has been

can also be accessed by reverse engineering.

debated by economists for a long time. In his work on innovation and patents,
Arrow [1962] attempted to point out the contradiction in Schumpeter's

Exclusive rights and market power

argument that large firms organized into monopolies offer the best chance of
continuous innovation [Schumpeter, 1943]. The demonstration of the

The intellectual property system gives an exclusive right to inventors and

superiority of competition by the founder of economic analysis of intellectual

creators over the work produced. This does not mean that they automatically

property is easy to understand. Before an invention, a company in a

obtain a monopoly over the market. A new product or cheaper process can be

competitive market simply recoups its costs, without generating any profit.

developed in different ways. For example, human insulin, which is superior to

The company will therefore appropriate the full profit generated by the

pig insulin for treating diabetes, can be produced either by using enzymes to

invention. A monopoly's starting position is different, because it already

eliminate an amino acid from pig insulin or by genetically modified bacteria.
Neither of the patents awarded for these inventions gave the applicants _

makes a profit. Innovation only offers it higher monopoly revenue. Because

Novo and Genentech _ a monopoly over the insulin market. Similarly, in the

profit before the invention) is lower than that of the competitor, the

its gain (i.e., the monopoly profit after the invention minus the monopoly

10
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monopoly firm has less incentive to innovate. However, this reasoning

latter's interest to buy it at a price below 120. The companies could agree, for

ignores competition between companies to conquer markets. The incentives

instance, to split the mutual gain of 20 in the deal by making the transaction

are different if the monopoly knows that a competitor can enter its market by
inventing and patenting a less expensive process or a similar new product. In

at a price of 110. If the first company had not been able to transfer its rights,
allocation of resources would not have been optimal and social wealth _

this case, the two companies will launch into a race to patent. If the

limited here to two agents _ would not have been maximized. Similarly, an

incumbent fails to win, it will lose its income and its investments, whereas if

innovating company that is less efficient at developing its invention has an

the entrant comes second, it will lose only its R&D expenditures. Here the

interest in selling or licensing its patent to a more efficient company.

incentive to innovate is stronger for the monopolist, even if the patent it
obtains remains a sleeping patent [Gilbert & Newberry, 1982].

Negotiating transfers of property rights and its effects on efficiency is
the subject of an economic theorem, known as the Coase Theorem [Coase,
1960; Stigler, 1966]. Ronald Coase argues that negotiation results in
allocative efficiency as long as property rights are clearly defined and there

Property rights to facilitate trade
11

are no other obstacles to the deal. Furthermore, resource allocation is
efficient regardless of the initial allocation of property rights. In a

Intellectual property and physical property share some economic

hypothetical world where rights on inventions and creations are precisely

functions. The incentive role of patents and copyrights that we have just seen

defined and where it does not cost anything to draft, sign and execute

is no different than the general role of property in terms of dynamic

contracts, innovations would always be used by those who value them most,

efficiency. Imagine a society with no real property law or land tenure rules. A

regardless of who made them in the first place. In other words, leaving aside

farmer clears a plot of land, fertilizes it and sows it, only to have a neighbor

incentive issues, if transaction costs are zero, the allocation of the initial

take the crop when it is ripe for harvest. Since the farmer has no title, either

rights on innovations does not affect the wealth created. Whether the first
innovator is granted a broad right _ e.g., an exclusive right on the production

to the land or to the harvest, he has no possibility of seeking redress. After
several thwarted attempts to farm, he will give up and switch to a different
activity with a shorter investment cycle.

of all recombined proteins or on all movies about the conquest of the Far
West _ or a narrow right _ e.g., on human insulin produced from genetically

We will see how the general role of property in the regulation of trade also

modified bacteria or on the first western The Great Train Robbery _ makes no

applies to intangible goods.

difference in terms of static efficiency. In such a perfect world, every new
word or idea could be assigned a property right and an owner and every user

Property rights and static efficiency

would have to pay to be able to use them.
However, in the economic system, it is relevant to assume that these

Intellectual property law grants exclusive, transferable rights. From an

transactions have costs: property rights are not always clearly defined;

economic point of view, transferability is just as important as exclusivity

drafting a sales or license contract requires time and expertise; and ensuring

because it ensures that the asset is used by the party who values it most. Let's

that parties comply with their commitments necessitates a system of

take the example of an integrated movie studio that makes a hit movie.

monitoring and penalties. The decisive factor is whether the transaction costs

Commercial exploitation of the movie in the studio's own movie theaters

are higher or lower than the gain of the transaction. Let's suppose that in the

would generate net discounted revenue of 100. A rival exhibitor with a larger

previous example of the studio and exhibitor, the transaction can only be

network of theaters could generate revenue of 120. It is therefore in the

performed at a cost of 21. This changes everything. The parties would lose 1

former's interest to sell its right to the latter at a price above 100 and in the

from the deal. They therefore have no interest in making it and the property

12
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right will remain in the hands of the less efficient company. If the transaction

It is the equivalent of the common, where all of the villagers' livestock could

cost is less than 20, the deal will go ahead, but the parties' gain will be smaller.

graze freely. The second zone is private and encompasses contemporary,

If the cost is 19, they will only have a gain of 1 to share.

protectable inventions and creations. It is parceled out like fenced arable

The public authority has two complementary means of action to

land. Every plot can be rented, sold or opened for passage in exchange for a

promote efficiency when transaction costs are positive. It can either grant the

toll. But how are the plots delimited? For artistic creations, the boundaries of

property right to the party best able to develop it from the outset, or it can

each plot are relatively easy to identify. The entire work is protected against

seek to facilitate transfers of rights by reducing transaction costs. For

literal copying. Note, however, that in the United Kingdom, under the right to

example, intellectual property law provides for nontechnical ideas and

parody, a work can be pastiched or caricatured, which leaves room for

theories to remain in the public domain. This exemption obviates the need to

criticism. In similar vein, in France, reproduction of extracts that do not

negotiate with an owner every time a phrase is pronounced or an idea is

exceed a few paragraphs is authorized without need to seek prior approval

expressed. Another example is that European and U.S. legislation authorizes

from the author. It is thus easy for a new author to know whether or not he is

associations of authors and composers to negotiate and collect rights revenue

infringing a neighbor's property.

from radio stations and concert organizers on behalf of their members.

The delimitation of property in the case of inventions is much more

Similarly, in the area of joint innovations, companies can group their patents
into a pool, which in turn issues a single license to users. For instance, the

cumbersome than for farmland or artistic works. The boundaries of ideas are not
as clear _ cut as plots of land or artistic expressions. Furthermore, the definition

MPEG2 standard, which is used to compress video data, began as a grouping

of the scope of an invention is left up to the inventor himself. Applicants must

of eight companies that owned around 100 patents. By authorizing such

append a list of claims to the description of their inventions. For example, in his

groupings, the public authority helps reduce transaction costs by removing

patent on the telegraph, Samuel Morse laid claim not only to the specific device

the need for every user to negotiate with every owner of a piece of intellectual

that he had developed, but to all uses of electromagnetic power for transmitting

property. By reducing the number of contracts, these collective mechanisms

signs or letters at any distance. In the space of works of the mind, the American

reduce transaction costs.

inventor attempted to stake out a concession that would include not only the
telegraph, but also semaphore, the fax and even television! The latitude given to

Delimiting intellectual property rights

inventors calls to mind the prospecting permits issued during the gold rush
(Kitch, 1977). In the Great North of America, pioneers who discovered signs of a

Introducing property rights is not enough to facilitate trade, however. A

gold deposit had to stake out their claim themselves. The delimitation of the

precise definition of those rights is also essential. When ownership of a good

territory of patents is guided by rules, however. The legal requirements of novelty

is not clearly defined, it becomes more difficult to trade. If the buyer does not

(i.e., the invention must not have existed previously), nonobviousness (i.e., the

know exactly what he is buying, he cannot correctly set a ceiling price. The

invention must not be readily apparent to a person skilled in the relevant field)

seller can lie about the merchandise to obtain a higher price. Despite the

and technical feasibility (i.e., the invention must be technically applicable) limit

mutual gain in the deal, the negotiation is likely to stall.

the possibilities of making claims. But the maximum limits they set remain very

We can visualize works of the mind as forming a finite space of

imprecise. This uncertainty over the limits of a patent can also discourage more

elements [Friedman, 2000]. Intellectual property law divides this space into

efficient companies from purchasing the right. Conversely, it can prompt the

two main zones. The first zone consists of creations to come and past
creations that are now in the public domain. This zone _ by far the larger of

acquisition of a license as a precautionary measure, since the purchaser does not

the two _ is an undivided whole. It can be used collectively and free of charge.

know whether his process infringes the competitor's patent or not. .

14
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Defining rights and its
consequences: a comparison of patents and
copyright
In terms of the balance

15

I/The Basic Economics of Intellectual Property Law

existing protection in his technical

inventor can block competitors, by

it can also block subsequent

field and analyze the validity of the

forcing them to switch to a

innovations, which might improve

claims of key patents. No such

different line of research or pay for

or complement the first invention.

undertaking is required for a

a license. The patent triggers a race

In other words, the patent offers

copyright application, since an

between inventors in which the

prospects of monopoly rent, which
rival companies vie for.

independent creation does not

winner takes all. Moreover, if the

between incentive and use, there is

infringe

initial patent is sufficiently broad,

no difference between patents and

Research of this kind would even

copyrights. The definition of their

be counterproductive, because it

respective

however,

could cast doubt on the work's

generates higher transaction costs

independence. Lastly, the cost of

scope,

another's

property.

Detecting and punishing infringements
A property right only has value if it is enforced. To ensure that it is, a

for patents than for copyrights. The

monitoring

prosecuting

whole arsenal of rules and judicial institutions is required. It is generally left

difficulty of defining an invention

infringements is also higher for

to holders of patents, copyrights and trademarks to monitor and detect

makes the delimitation of the

patents than for copyright. This is

offenses. In the event of infringement, a dispute can be taken to court. In the

patented property imprecise, thus

due not only to the imprecise limits

United States, there are around 100 patent trials a year. This figure is much

increasing filing costs. The inven-

of patents, but also to the greater

smaller than the number of infringements reported, because most intellectual

tor must stake out his territory by

ease of detecting industrial piracy

property disputes are settled out of court. This disproportion is explained by

submitting claims to the patent

in

the costs and timeframes of litigation. For U.S. patents, the number of

office. None of this is required for

Infringements

firms

complaints is 16 times higher than the number of court cases [Lemley, 2001].

copyright. The application proce-

generally take the form of a

According to the economic theory of crime [Becker, 1968], in order to

dures, if there are any, are reduced

publication and are therefore easily

be dissuasive, a fine must take into account the probability of detection. The

to a minimum, with the patent offi-

observed, contrary to the imitation

idea is that a potential economic criminal will abide by the law as long as the

ce acting as a mere recording

of patented processes, for example.

benefit he derives from his crime is lower than the penalty multiplied by the

the

and

case

of
by

copyright.
rival

more

likelihood of being caught. This is particularly low for intellectual property

of the property are those of the

conducive to strategic behavior

because infringement is often difficult to establish. To detect the use of a

work itself. These are specified ex

than copyrights. The protection of a

patented process by a competitor, one needs to enter his factory; to catch a

post by a judge in the event of

literary or artistic work only fences

small-time infringer who copies software to sell it to friends and family would

litigation.

off an infinitesimal part of the

take a policeman in every house. Consequently the level of penalties should

clarity also explains why it is rarely

space

a

be extremely high. However, this is not usually the case. In a modern

violated

By

copyright reduces only fractionally

democratic system, it is not easy to impose a heavy fine or a jail sentence for

contrast, an inventor can easily

the opportunities for other writers,

photocopying a book or recording a cassette for sale (Watt, 2000).

infringe a patent without realizing

musicians or painters. By contrast,

The implementation costs of intellectual property law are high and

it. To avoid doing so, he must

patents offer much broader protec-

directly incurred by the parties, which hinders trade. Given that the right he

undertake costly prior research on

tion. By being the first to patent, an

acquires will be difficult to defend, the buyer revises his valuation down,

chamber. The general boundaries

Copyright's

greater

unintentionally.

Patents

of

are

creations.

also

Filing
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which can cancel out the mutual gain and end up preventing the transaction.
Ex post transaction costs thus have the same effect as costs generated before
a contract is signed. They can prevent the exploitation of rights by the most
efficient companies.
The tragedy of the anticommons
The parceling out of intellectual property is an impediment to trade,
which economists have termed "tragedy of the anticommons" [Heller and
Eisenberg, 1998]. This expression describes a situation in which several
individuals own rights of exclusion. By exercising those rights, they restrict
access and therefore use of common resources.
Let's take the example of a technology based on two patents held by two
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different inventors. To use the technology, companies must obtain a license
from each inventor. This double negotiation increases the transaction costs
for the purchaser, compared with a situation in which he would only have to
deal with a single owner. However, the tragedy of the anticommons goes
beyond this. It stems from the fact that the two inventors set the prices of
their licenses separately. If one inventor lowers his price, he will sell more
licenses because the cost of access to the technology for consumers will fall.
But this additional demand will also benefit the other inventor even though
he has made no sacrifice on his unit margin. When the benefit of a reduction
in price is only partly appropriated by the person who decided it, neither has
an incentive to fully play that card. As a result, the total price of the
technology will be higher than the price that a single owner would have
charged. Consequently, the technology will be underutilized.

When one owner is better
than two

technology) must obtain a license

holders. All consumers whose

Note that a concentration of rights

consent to pay is higher than P1 +

is also favorable to owners. When

P2 will request a license from each
owner. Owing to the distribution of

there are two owners, each makes a

preferences, demand for licenses is

2/9, whereas with one owner, his

equal to 1 - ( P1+P2 ). The profit of

profit is 1/4, which is more than

right holder 1 can be written as

2/9.

profit of 1/9, i.e., a total profit of

P1[(1 - ( P1 + P2 )] and that of right
holder 2 as P2 [(1 - ( P1 - P2 )].

sense if we consider that when

The profit of the former will be

there are several holders of a right

maximum when the derivative can-

of access, each applying a margin,

cels out, or 2 P1+ P2 = 1 ; similarly,
the profit of the latter will be maxi-

the good is more expensive. This

mum at 2 P2+P1 = 1. The solution
of this system of equations leads to

however. If the rights holders are
subject to perfect competition, the

P1= P2 = 1/3. The price of the good

price of the licenses is equal to

for the consumer will therefore be

marginal cost and profit is zero.

The previous result makes

only applies in a monopoly,

2/3. Let's imagine now that there is

The superiority of a single

only one owner of the song or

monopoly over a chain of several

technology who sets a price of P.

monopolies was demonstrated by

His profit is written as P(1 - P), and

Augustin Cournot as early as 1838.

the derivative is equal to 1 - 2 P. It

Using the example of copper and

now cancels out for the value

zinc, the two raw components of

P = 1/2. In other words, when the

brass, he established that two

exclusive rights are in the hands of

separate vertical monopolies were

one person, the price of the good

more disadvantageous for society

will be set at a lower level and more

than one.

consumers will have access to it.

from both creators to have access
to the good. Let's suppose that

Take a song produced by a

consumers' consent to pay is

lyricist and a composer (or a tech-

distributed uniformly along a [0.1]

nology built out of two inventions).

continuum between.

Every consumer of the song (or the

are the prices charged by the rights

P1 and P2

The underutilization of technical or artistic resources as a result of
parceled intellectual property is often compared to the overexploitation of
natural resources when access is free. This situation was first described as the
"tragedy of the commons" by Garrett Hardin in 1968, using the example of
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fish stocks. When a fisherman catches fish of reproductive age, he reduces
future fish stocks. The fisherman's action penalizes all fishermen, including
himself. But, unlike other fishermen, he offsets the damage to himself with a
benefit that he alone appropriates _ a higher catch _ so his net situation
improves. Every fisherman is tempted to adopt this freeriding behavior,
which leads to the depletion of the natural resource and a tragedy of the
commons.
The difference between the two tragedies lies in the favorable or
unfavorable effect of the actions on other users. When the owner of an
exclusive access right lowers his price, he generates a positive externality _

II/Patents and Efficiency

his decision benefits other owners of complementary licenses. Conversely,
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when the user of a natural resource increases his level of extraction, he
generates a negative externality _ his action causes damage to other users of

The economic principle underlying patents is to give inventors a

the common good. The two cases are symmetrical [Buchanan and Yoon,

temporary monopoly over their discoveries, in order to encourage innovation.

2000]. One leads to overexploitation, the other to underutilization. This also

The implementation of this principle is not so simple, however. What sort of

illustrates the general economic rule, according to which the level of

rights should be given to innovators? How should they be defined? Patents

production is not optimal when there are externalities.

can indeed differ widely in duration and scope. Determining the right design
requires understanding how these different characteristics affect the

Intellectual property law has created a system of exclusive, temporary,

economy. This is what economic analysis of patents aims to do.

transferable rights. The first two characteristics reflect the specific properties
of information. They represent a compromise between dynamic efficiency to
favor innovation and static efficiency to promote use by the greatest number.

Patents and the benefit of innovation

Transferability is another aspect of property. By permitting trade and
reducing transaction costs, the laws protecting works of the mind facilitate
the use of inventions and creations by those who value them most.

The net social benefit of an innovation is the difference between the
welfare it brings to society, and its cost, particularly in the R&D investment.

The two aspects are complementary. When the costs of selling a

Any innovation whose net social benefit is positive should be produced. By

license fall, because of more clearly defined rights for example, the inventor

allowing innovators to reap the benefits of their innovations, patents come

or creator can hope to obtain a higher profit. This strengthens incentives to

close to that objective, but do not attain it. Indeed, patents are behind various

innovate.

mechanisms that cause net social benefit to diverge from net private benefit,

These two aspects are also a yardstick for discussion in the following

depending on the decision of the innovator. Designing an optimal patent

chapters of ways to implement and reform intellectual property law. Is the

therefore consists in seeking the best compromise between these different

compromise reached between incentive and use the most satisfactory in

effects. The first part of the chapter offers an overview of these mechanisms,

terms of social welfare? Are allocation and enforcement of intellectual

which are recapitulated in the table on next page.

property rights achieved at the least cost to society?
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The effect of patents on the net benefit of an innovation
Private

Public

Benefit

Temporary monopoly

Knowledge externalities

Cost

Investment in R&D

Duplication of investment
Deadweight loss

II/Patents and Efficiency
namely by favoring the diffusion of knowledge. An innovation can be defined
as a set of new information. Information is a highly specific type of good. It is
by nature non rival, because it is not destroyed when it is consumed. A
mathematical theorem, for example, does not deteriorate with use. Non
rivalry, combined with free access and use (i.e., non-exclusivity), is key to the
knowledge externalities created by innovations. The information that makes
up an innovation can be used without limit, by everyone. These are positive
externalities, because they contribute to social welfare.

Patents and innovation surplus

Knowledge externalities play a particularly important role in the
research sector, where R&D activities build on the results of past innovations.
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The distortions caused by the innovator's monopoly affect the amount

This is the meaning of Isaac Newton's famous quote "if I have seen further it

and the distribution of the surplus generated by the innovation. The

is by standing on the shoulders of giants." And it is in part because Albert

monopoly is in a position to set a higher price than if it were in competition.

Einstein knew and wanted to surpass Newton's theory of gravity that he

By doing so, it excludes some consumers, who would buy the innovation if it

developed the theory of relativity. Similarly, a team of engineers in charge of

were sold at competition price. This deadweight loss reduces the total surplus
created by the innovation _ at least during the lifetime of the patent.

developing a new type of internal combustion engine does not have to

Furthermore, the profit collected by the innovator is lower than the

reinvent everything from scratch; they can draw on all the existing patents
relating to internal combustion engines.

social value of the innovation. If the monopoly based its price solely on those

Although the information about an innovation is non rival, it must be

consumers willing to pay the most for the innovation, it would discourage all

accessible to create an externality. In the absence of a patent, this condition

other consumers. The monopoly must therefore set a lower price and give

is not automatic. Indeed, ownership of a product does not necessarily imply

consumers some of the surplus. This consumer surplus is higher when

provision of information about the technology. Often the innovation can only

consumers react sharply to a change in price, i.e., when demand is highly

be accessed by reverse engineering the product. This means taking it apart in

elastic.

order to understand how it works. This method works well for some
Thus the mechanism designed to remunerate the inventor of an

technologies, such as semiconductor chips, because their printed circuit

innovation reduces the net social value of the innovation and only allows the

boards are clearly visible. It may be much more time-consuming and costly in

innovator to appropriate some of the remaining value. This limitation on the

other cases. For example, it is extremely difficult to find the source code-the

privatization of the benefit of the innovation should be put in perspective,

program-of a piece of software from its object code-the translation of the

however. It is not necessary for the innovator to appropriate the total surplus

source code into machine language, which is the only code that can be

created by the innovation. To ensure that the innovation will be produced, it

accessed from the commercialized version of the software.

is sufficient for him to recoup his investment in R&D.

In this regard, another justification for patents is the requirement for
filers to publish information about their innovations. This makes the

Knowledge externalities and the role of patents

knowledge contained in innovations accessible at no cost. Apart from being
an incentive to invest in R&D, the temporary monopoly is thus also an

If, by giving rise to a monopoly, the patent reduces the social surplus

incentive for firms to divulge the knowledge produced. This function of patent

created by the innovation, it can also increase that surplus in another way,

systems is concretized in patent office databases, which offer free access to all
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existing patents. In this specific case, patents are thus a factor in the diffusion
of information. They increase the social return of the innovation, without
diminishing the private return for the innovator.

e

Indeed, E(n )=0 means, from (1),

the expected social benefit (p(n)v

that:

curve) and the corresponding total
e

e

p(n ) v - n c = 0

R&D cost (line nc). On the graph,

This simple model explains

Negative effects of patent races

the dissipation of the innovation

The impact of the monopoly conferred by patents on the amount and

rent by the patent race.

this is shown as level n* . But the
ability for firms to enter the patent
e

race freely leads to point n , where

allocation of surplus or on knowledge externalities concerns the benefits of
innovations. But patents also have an influence on their cost. The monopoly

nc

they grant can create a situation in which only one of several firms that have
undertaken investments in R&D will appropriate all the profits generated by

p(n)v

an innovation. This "winner takes all" situation triggers patent races, with the
result that the future value of an innovation is squandered on R&D
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investments.

A simple model of a
patent race

a value of v (the same to simplify
for the innovator and for society)
and the cost of an R&D investment

The depletion of the value of
an innovation by a race to patent

is c, the expected profit of a firm
that enters the race is:

model where

p(n)

is the

A graph version of the
model shows why this race is
suboptimal. The graph represents

p(n)
E(n)=
v-c
n

can be illustrated by a simple

*

n

(1)

the expected benefit (private and
public) p(n)v of the innovation as a

ne

n

the total cost equals the expected
e

profit. We observe that n >n*.
Thus the number of firms
participating in the race is always
higher than the number that

probability that the innovation will

Firms will enter the race as

be produced when n firms have

long as the expected profit is

undertaken investments in R&D.

positive

Every

investment

increase in the number of firms

increases the probability that the

reduces the expected profit, the

innovation will be produced, but

total

less than the previous investment.

participating in the race will finally

is p(n) increasing and

be the one that verifies E(n )=0.

concave. If n firms have taken part
in the race and the innovation is

It can easily be verified that the
social benefit for the race _ i.e., the

problem of the tragedy of the commons. The prospect of producing an

realised, each firm has one chance

difference between the expected

innovation encourages too many firms to attempt to obtain the patent. In the

in n of obtaining the patent.

benefit for society and the sum of
investments undertaken _ is zero.

end, these firms will have undertaken combined R&D investments above

additional

Therefore

Consequently, if the innovation has

(E(n)>0

number

). As the

ne of

firms

function of the total investment
effort n, and the social cost of that
investment effort, nc, also a
function of n. The socially optimal

maximizes welfare. The excessive
investments undertaken by firms
waste the benefit that society
derives from the innovation.

investment effort is one that
maximizes the difference between

e

Patent races can be considered as a particular case of the more general

what would have been sufficient to produce the innovation. In other words,
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the collective investment effort is higher than the optimal effort. It does not

limit? The problem is that long patents also have a cost, stemming from the

maximize the social return of the innovation, defined as the difference

discount rate, the "cost of time," and from the deadweight loss generated by

between its expected profit and its cost.

the monopoly.

The phenomenon of patent races can take another form. For all firms
to enter the race freely, they must be informed that there is an innovation to

Why is patent duration limited?

be made [O'Donoghue et al., 1998]. Unless the opportunity to develop an
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innovation is public knowledge, the race will be limited to the firms that have

The discount rate is the first limit on the efficiency of long patents,

the relevant information. This is also the case where a fixed number of already

because it erodes the incentive power of profits that are a long way off in the

established firms are the only ones to have knowledge about a technological

future. An innovator compares his future profits to the R&D investment he

lead to explore and the technical and financial resources to conduct that

must undertake in order to produce an innovation. For the decision to

exploration. For example, it is likely that only major oil companies will invest

innovate to be profitable, the money invested in research must generate at

in developing new deep sea drilling techniques. This does not eliminate the

least as much profit as it would if it were invested elsewhere, such as in an

race or excessive level of investment, however. In the absence of new

interest-bearing bank account. The more distant in time the expected profit

entrants, the competitors in place will make stronger efforts. The higher the

from the innovation, the less able it is to compete with the cumulative interest

expected returns, the more the oil majors will invest in research.

that a bank account would generate.

These discrepancies between the social return of patents and their
private return _ the only one that motivates innovators _ prompts us to take
a detailed look at the characteristics of patents. How does the duration of a
patent influence the differences between social and private costs? Can the
scope of a patent affect deadweight loss? Do knowledge externalities always
escape from the control of the patent owner?

Optimal patent duration
The duration of a patent is undoubtedly the most direct way that
legislators have of controlling the scope of rights granted to innovators.
Patents currently last for 20 years. Extending that duration would amount to
granting additional profits to innovators and thus increasing their incentives
to innovate. So why don't patents last indefinitely? For an innovation to be
produced, the profits generated by the patent must cover R&D costs. By
guaranteeing maximum profit to the innovator, an infinite monopoly would
make it possible to recoup even bigger investments, which would mean more
innovations. So why is the incentive power of patents restrained by a time

The value of a patent

of the monopoly profits generated
by the patent. More precisely, it

A patent is not a full proper-

must factor in all the future

ty right, because it does not last as

revenues generated by the patent,

long as the good that it protects. Its

weighted for their distance in time.

validity is limited to 20 years,

Indeed, the same sum of money

whereas the information it protects

will have a different value, depend-

will never disappear. A patent is

ing on whether it is collected today

nevertheless an asset, which can be

or at a future date, because in the

bought and sold at a certain price.

intervening time it can earn

What is the right price, i.e.,

interest. For example, $100 inves-

the correct value of the patent

ted at 10% interest today will be

asset? The price must allow the

worth $110 (=100*1,10) in a year's

owner to sell the patent without

time. Conversely, income of $100

losing money. It must also enable

that will be generated by a patent in

the buyer to acquire the patent

a year's time is worth only $90.90

without losing money. It must

(=100/1,10) today. Likewise, $100

therefore be an accurate reflection

in two years' time is worth $82.60
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today, or (100/1,10)/1,10=100/1,102.

We can see that the value of

The value of a patent is calculated

the patent depends negatively on

II/Patents and Efficiency

The principle of
Nordhaus's model

long enough for both innovations
to be produced. One monopoly

according to this principle of

the rate of interest r. This stems

discounting, where every future

from the fact that the higher the

Nordhaus's model [1969] is

profit flow is expressed as a present

interest rate, the smaller the

used to determine the optimal

c1=

value, also called discounted value.

present value of future profits. The

duration of a patent. This inset

monopoly periods are required

period is enough to recoup the
investment in innovation 1, for
1*1 year. However, three

Let's suppose for example

value of the patent also depends

presents a simplified version of the

to cover innovation 2, since

that a patent lasts T years, that the

positively on its duration T. The

model, which illustrates the main

c2=

rate of interest is r, and that each

longer the patent, the more profit

idea.

the patent should therefore be

year t the patent generates a profit of

can be accumulated. Conversely,

Let us imagine that the

three periods. However, the total

3*3 years. The duration of

. The value V of the patent at

the value of the patent diminishes

lifetime of an innovation is divided

surplus over all the periods is

the time it is granted (at the begin-

as it approaches term. It is of

into three equal periods. Two

higher when the patent lasts only

ning of T years) is therefore:

course zero when T=0.

innovations can be produced at the

one period, even though this means

beginning of the first period, at

that only innovation 1 will be

The fact that profits distant in time have less incentive power for the

R&D costs of c1=10 for the first

produced. This is because a longer

innovation and c2=30 for the
second. If innovation 1 is protected

patent, while it enables innovation

by a patent, it generates a profit of

innovation 1 : it prolongs its exploi-

2 to be produced, is not neutral on

and a utility of u1=2 for

tation needlessly by two monopoly

removed in time is less effective at offsetting the social cost of a long patent.

consumers in each period. In the

periods. This negative effect is here

This cost results from monopoly pricing. Given this deadweight loss, it is

absence of a monopoly, competi-

greater than the positive effect of

costly for society to extend this monopoly beyond the duration necessary to

tion will increase the total surplus,

producing new innovations.

reimburse the innovator. Extending the duration of patents uniformly thus

and consumers reap the full

generates both a benefit and a cost for society. On the one hand, it allows

benefit. As a result, consumer

investment-intensive innovations to be financed. On the other, the owners of

utility becomes U1 =20 >

patents on less costly innovations are needlessly subsidized via an extension

. Innovation 2 is more costly and

of their monopolies.

has a higher value. If it is protected

innovator is a first justification for limiting the length of patents. Profit

This tradeoff was first expressed by Nordhaus [1969] to explain the

t=10

1+u1

rate

which is reproduced here, to calculate the optimal duration of a patent. To

for u2=4 consumers. Without

reach this conclusion, Nordhaus assumes that as the profits of innovations
increase, their R&D costs increase even more _ i.e., an assumption of

patent protection, it therefore

diminishing returns of R&D. In that light, beyond a certain patent duration,

for consumers.

the loss induced by the extension of existing monopolies.

1+u1

U1

U1

W(1) = 2 + 20 + 20 = 42

by a patent, it is assumed to gene-

finite duration of patents. He uses a model, a highly simplified version of

the social welfare generated by more costly new innovations no longer offsets

The patent lasts for one period:

2=12 for the innovator and

generates

U2 =24 > 2 + u2

The problem for legislators
is to set a patent duration that is

The patent lasts for three periods:
(

1+u1-c1)

(

2+u2-c2)

(

1+u1)

(

2+u2)

+

(

+

1+u1)
+

(

W(3) = -22 + 28 + 28 = 34

2+u2)
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The result is that a short patent generates more welfare than a long
patent: W(3)<W(1). A short patent is therefore preferable, even though it

II/Patents and Efficiency
want to extend their patents is that innovations are selected according to their
value.

does not enable all the innovations to be produced.

Adjusting duration through patent renewal mechanisms

Optimal patent breadth
The concept of patent breadth measures the use that the innovator can
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Nordhaus's argument can be generalized: the problem is that there is

make of the patent vis-à-vis his competitors. A narrow patent does not

only one uniform duration for innovations of differing values and costs.

provide sufficient protection against infringement; a broad patent effectively

Specifically, patents are of equal length regardless of the economic agents

dissuades competitors from imitating the innovation. Patent duration is set

involved even though the R&D investments required to develop a patentable

by law and is unambiguous. By contrast, patent breadth is defined only

innovation vary widely from one sector to another. For example, it is much

indirectly by law, and is often interpreted from an economic viewpoint by the

easier to develop a new toaster than a new drug. Elasticities of demand, and

courts as a last resort. The question of the best way to define patent breadth

therefore deadweight loss induced by a monopoly, are also highly variable. If

remains open. By favoring the owner over the competition, a broad patent

the market power of a monopoly is higher in the pharmaceuticals sector than

reinforces the incentives to innovate. Does this mean that patent length and

in chemicals, it would be logical, in the light of Nordhaus's argument, to

breadth are equivalent variables of public action? Is there an optimal

compensate that power with a shorter patent duration in pharmaceuticals.

breadth?

Modern patent systems provide for a way to counter the uniform
length of patents. A renewal mechanism allows firms to modify the duration
of their patents at the margin. At regular intervals, they can choose to extend

The relationship between patent breadth and the legal
definition of a patent

the duration of their patent, up to a maximum term, in exchange for a fee, the
amount of which increases over time. In France, for instance, fewer than 50%
of patents are maintained beyond 10 years [Schankerman, 1998], and fewer

Patent breadth is not a legal concept. It is therefore important to
clarify the relationship between the economic concept and legal practice.

than 7% are extended to their maximum term [Pakes, 1986]. Is this solution

A patent consists of two parts: a description of the innovation and a

socially efficient [Scotchmer, 1999]? The older a patent, the higher the

list of claims. It is these claims that delimit the rights conferred by the patent,

expected profit from an additional year of monopoly must be to offset the

and therefore its breadth. To ensure that the claims are not excessive, they

renewal fee. Consequently, protection will only be extended on innovations

must be consistent with the description of the innovation. However, the law

with a higher value. Renewal is therefore useful insofar as these innovations

stipulates that an innovation is only patentable if its description meets three

are also the most costly.

criteria. The precise definition of these criteria varies from country to
country, but is substantively the same. For example, the European Patent

To conclude, economic analysis thus provides a key argument in favor

Office's patentability criteria for an innovation are novelty, inventive step,

of limiting patent duration: it is preferable to forgo the creation of the most

and industrial applicability. Breadth is thus initially determined by a patent

costly innovations in order to expand consumer access to less costly

office examiner, who applies the three criteria and evaluates the consistency

innovations. Looking at economic effects also highlights the way fee-based

between the claims and the description of the innovation.

patent renewal systems work: the particular effect of taxing innovators who

A firm armed with a patent can impose its legal monopoly by suing a
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competitor for infringement on the basis of the claims of the patent. However,

Having specified the links between breadth and the legal definition of

competitors often defend themselves by challenging the validity of the patent

a patent, we can come back to our question: is breadth a comparable incentive

in the light of the patentability criteria. Thus, after the patent office examiner,

instrument to length for innovators? More precisely, to provide a given level

a judge can confirm, invalidate or redefine the breadth of a patent. In addition

of incentive, is it better to grant innovators short broad patents or long

to patentability criteria, case law and the doctrines that ensue from it are thus

narrow patents? This question has sparked numerous works of economic

another way to define breadth. The U.S. "doctrine of equivalents" is an

theory, which have provided elements for a complete analysis.

important example, which supports an increase in patent breadth. It
evaluates the breadth of a patent by interpreting the spirit, rather than the

Breadth and market power

letter, of the claims.
One way to evaluate the breadth of a patent is in terms of the power it

Keys to understanding the
concept of patent breadth
31

carbonized materials could be used

confers on the product market [Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990]. In this case, a

successfully as incandescing

broad patent reinforces the innovator's monopoly by providing better

conductors. This example illus-

protection against infringement. In particular, it offers a way of excluding

The description of a few

trates the requirement of a link

from the market more products that differ from the patented product but that

patents can assist our intuitive

between the description of the

are substitutes for it [Klemperer, 1990]. For example, Howard Head, the

understanding of breadth. The

invention and the claims.

inventor of the oversized tennis racket, holds a patent that gives him a

examples

presented

here

are

The next example is an

monopoly on rackets with a strung surface of between 85 and 130 square

borrowed from Merges and Nelson

illustration of the doctrine of

inches. Because there are no fallback solutions, consumers are captive and

[1990].

equivalents. International Nickel

the patent owner can thus charge the highest prices and increase his profits.

In 1895, Thomas Edison

obtained a patent that covered a

The strategy adopted by Texas Instruments in 1986 is another illustration of

challenged the validity of a very

cast ferrous alloy. The patent des-

this [Hall and Ziedonis, 2001]. After successfully asserting its patents in court

broad patent for materials used in

cribed the addition to molten iron

during 1985-1986, TI used this confirmation of the breadth of its patents to

light bulb filaments. The patentees

of a "small but effective" quantity of

charge higher royalties to the firms using its technology.

had found that carbonized paper

magnesium, fixed by the patent at

Broadening a patent to strengthen the innovator's monopoly increases

worked as an effective light-emit-

"about 0.04%" as a minimum.

the deadweight loss and consequently reduces total welfare. In comparison,

ting conductor in light bulbs. Based

International Nickel accused Ford

the neutrality of patent length on market power makes it an easy tool to use.

on this invention, they filed a

Motor Company of infringement

Increasing the length extends the monopoly over time. However, the market

patent claiming the right to use all

when Ford began making a nodular

power and deadweight loss it creates at a given time remain constant.

carbonized

textile

iron, even though Ford's iron

Choosing between patent length and breadth amounts to comparing the

incandescing

contained under 0.02% magne-

social cost of extending the monopoly over time to that of reinforcing the

conductor. Edison won the case

sium. Although this technique was

monopoly during the fixed duration of the patent. In their first model

because the claims exceeded what

outside of the literal scope of the

designed to determine optimal breadth, Gilbert and Shapiro showed that

the patented invention made it

claim, it was judged to be an equi-

deadweight loss increased at a faster rate with breadth than with length. This

possible to produce technically. In

valent substance, and thus to

led them to conclude that an infinite-lived narrow patent was preferable to a

particular, they did not say which

infringe the patent.

short-lived broad patent to provide a given level of incentive.

material

as

fibrous
an

or
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reached the opposite conclusion to Gilbert and Shapiro, by showing that a
short, broad patent is generally preferable. In other words, according to

Evaluating patent breadth in terms of market power makes it easier to

Gallini, it is better to have a strong monopoly for a short period than an

understand its effect on competition. However, this overlooks the effects of

oligopoly for a longer period with the needless imitation costs it generates. A

breadth on research effort. Where do potential rival products come from?

simple model helps us understand the logic of this result.

What does it cost to create them? To answer these questions correctly, we
need to apply a more precise definition of breadth, in terms of technology.
Indeed, the wording of a patent designates a technology rather than the
services it renders. A patent thus leaves room for other innovators to compete

The principle of Gallini's
model [1992]

with the innovation by using different technologies so that their products

This can be done by choosing the

cannot be considered imitations. In other words, competitors can circumvent
a patent and offer products that can be substituted for the innovation.
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The problem for regulators
is to design the optimal patent.

Let us imagine an innova-

patent duration: one or two

tion with a lifetime that can be

periods. It can also be done by

What is the effect of breadth on their strategies? If patent breadth is

divided into two periods. If the

choosing the breadth, i.e., the cost

interpreted in terms of technology, the broader the patent, the more difficult

innovation is distributed free of

of R&D, noted as C, required to

it will be to imitate the technology or offer an alternative. Gallini [1992]

charge, it creates a surplus of

produce the innovation or an

proposes a definition of breadth that explains its effect on competitors.

V=40,

imitation.

Breadth can be measured by the R&D cost required to imitate a patented

consumers. If there is a monopoly

One possibility is to design a

innovation without infringing the patent.

and no imitation, the total surplus

short patent (one period) that is
sufficiently broad to prevent any

share the market. Because the innovation can be freely accessed once the

S(1)=25 consists of the monopoly
profit (1)=20 and the consumer
utility u(1)=5. If there is one

patent expires, it is only possible to make a profit in the market during the

imitation, the market becomes a

imitator's profit during the validity

validity of the patent. The longer the patent, the more incentive imitators

duopoly. The total surplus is then

of the patent. Let us assume it is 11.
In this case, the first innovator

patent attracts imitators by giving them the time to recover the cost of their

S(2)=30, divided between a profit
(2) =10 per firm, and a utility of u(2)=10 for consumers.

imitation, whereas a broad patent dissuades imitators by increasing the cost

Lastly, if there are two imitations,

innovation to be produced.

of imitation.

the total surplus becomes (3)=35,

The alternative consists in

(3) =5 for each firm and
u(3)=20 for consumers. We verify
that V>S(3)>S(2)>S(1), which

designing a long patent (two

corresponds to the fact that the

that the imitation cost is less than

deadweight loss increases as com-

10, say 9. In this case, two

petition decreases.

imitations will be produced.

In that case, the patent no longer gives the innovator a monopoly over
a market. Rather, it defines the conditions under which the innovator must

have to invest in the creation of alternative technologies. By contrast, a broad
patent makes it costly for imitators to enter the market. In other words, a long

What are the social consequences of patent design? A long patent
creates competition by encouraging imitation. Although limited to the
innovator and the imitators, this competition benefits consumers. However,
the imitation also has a cost for society. The R&D expenditure undertaken by
the imitators is useless, because an equivalent technology _ the patented
technology _ has already been developed.
In a model that takes these different effects into account, Gallini

which

fully

benefits

of

i.e.,

imitation. The R&D cost must be
higher than 10, i.e., higher than any

would enjoy a monopoly profit,
which would be sufficient for the

periods) that is sufficiently narrow
to allow imitation. Let us consider
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Patent is short (one period) and

result can be ascribed to two main

broad (C=11):

factors. Firstly, the long patent

(1)+u1 - C

V

prolongs the deadweight loss over
an additional period. But, more
importantly,

W(1) = 14 + 40 = 54

the

prospect

of

reduced competition during the
Patent is long (two periods) and

lifetime of the patent attracts

narrow (C=9):

imitators. However, although their

3 (3)+u(3)-3C

(3)+u(3)

W(2) = 8 + 35 = 43

35

Therefore W(1) >W(2)

entry on the market lowers the
monopoly price practiced by the
innovator,

it

also

multiplies

R&D

uselessly

investments.

Imitation therefore causes useless
duplications of investment, which

The total surplus is higher if
the patent is broad and short. This

do not necessarily offset its positive
effect on competition.

From technology to market
An approach to breadth from the angle of technology is useful because
it sticks closely to the legal definition of the patent and highlights the

imitators. This will occur when the expected profit of an imitator, at the level
of competition prevailing on the market, is insufficient for him to recover his
R&D investment.
The cost of imitation is therefore a determining factor. If imitation is
very costly, the patent owner does not need to grant licenses _ he can take the
full profit from his monopoly. Conversely, if imitation is easily affordable, the
patent owner is compelled to forgo part of his profit by granting licenses, in
order to dissuade imitators. This case is favorable to social welfare. It enables
society to benefit from a competitive price, by saving on redundant R&D
investments. The only problem is to ensure sufficient profit to encourage the
first innovator. Maurer and Scotchmer [1998] showed that this condition is
met when the cost of an imitation is sufficiently close to the cost of the first
innovation. They draw the conclusion that patents should penalize imitators,
but not good-faith inventors who have produced a competing innovation by
their own means.
This result is particularly interesting as it also responds to the
problem of patent races. Indeed, the prize for the winner of the race, i.e., the
profit reaped by the innovator, is not as great if the patent owner is forced to
license his innovation in order to dissuade imitators. This makes a race less
attractive, which in turn reduces redundant investments. A narrow patent can
thus save imitation costs and limit the excessive costs of patent races.

dynamics of innovation and imitation. It is nevertheless still incomplete,
because it does not take the patent owner's ability to grant licenses into
account. Licensing offers the patent holder a way of voluntarily sharing the

Models of breadth

market with potential imitators, rather than letting them invest in their own
alternative technologies [Gallini, 1984]. What are the consequences of license
agreements on R&D strategies and consequently on optimal breadth?

Gilbert &

Gallini

Maurer &

Shapiro

[1992]

Scotchmer

[1990]

By granting licenses on his technology, the patent holder creates

[1998]

new competitors on his market. His monopoly profit is therefore diminished,

Product market

yes

yes

yes

but to a limited extent, because he can appropriate the profit generated by the

Cost of imitation

-

yes

yes

Licenses

-

-

yes

long and

short and

long and

narrow

broad

narrow

competitors he created through license royalties. What can be gained from
diminishing one's market power in this way? Creating licensed competitors is
in fact a way to lower the price while maintaining control of the market. The
patent owner can grant licenses until the market price becomes dissuasive for

Optimal patent
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Should we conclude that length must prevail over breadth in the
design of the optimal patent? This seems reasonable… as long as it is applied
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replacing the initial innovation, they use and reproduce it. Should they be
considered as infringements?

reasonably! The arguments presented so far relate to the protection provided
by patents against imitation and competing innovations. Breadth can be

What is a cumulative innovation?

measured as the difference between the competing innovations and the
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patented innovation. This definition of breadth has its limits, however.

The sequential link between cumulative innovations can take different

Indeed, an important aspect of breadth has been deliberately ignored until

forms. One category of cumulative innovations consists of innovations that

now. A patent owner can protect himself against competing innovations that

improve the quality of an existing product, for example, the addition of a new

differ from his own. But he may also be confronted with another form of

element to increase the resistance of an alloy. Another category is innovations

innovation that, without necessarily representing a threat, represents an

that reduce the cost of a production process, for example the discovery of a

improvement on his own invention. The technological extension of

catalyst that can speed up production of a chemical product. A third type of

innovations raises a new question about patent breadth: does intellectual

cumulative innovation is the discovery of new applications of an invention.

property apply also to the posterity of an innovation? The originality and

The idea of using a steam machine-originally designed to power factories-to

implications of this question merit separate analysis.

drive a ship is an example of this type of cumulative innovation. Finally,
cumulativity is characteristic of research tools, which are innovations that are
used to produce other innovations.

The efficiency of patents in the case of cumulative
innovations

Sharing incentives and holdup

Protection of R&D investments is not the only purpose of patents.

When several innovations depend on one another, the exploitation of

They also facilitate the diffusion of knowledge externalities, as was shown in

the technological prospect often requires the involvement of several different

the first part of this chapter. The publication of patents makes scientific

actors. The development of a drug, for example, is the culmination of several

knowledge public, which can benefit other researchers. It can also assist

discoveries, involving a number of research teams, both fundamental and

future research indirectly, for example by helping to better define a question

applied. How should the profits generated by the drug be shared? Should a

that remains open. But publication can also open the gates for research that

patent be given to each innovator, or should the first innovator be given all

is directly linked to the initial innovation and that would not have been

the rights on later innovations? Although the ultimate success of the research

undertaken otherwise. The pioneer patent filed by George Selden in 1895 is

is in everyone's interest, an inadequate distribution of the rights among the

an example. Selden's patent, which described for the first time an automobile

different successive innovators risks nipping it in the bud. A rational agent

powered by an internal combustion engine, spurred many innovations aimed

will think twice before undertaking research if the commercial exploitation of

at improving on it. This eventually led to the modern engines used today. In

the result depends on the holder of a previous patent. This is the classic

another field, the Cohen-Boyer patent application filed in 1973 was a similar

economic problem of holdup.

event. The patent describes gene coding of proteins and its publication

Holdup can be explained using a simple model borrowed from Green

opened up a vast field of research in genetic biology. Innovations that result

and Scotchmer [1995]. In the model there are two cumulative innovations.

from other innovations are termed "cumulative". Cumulative innovations are

Taken in isolation, the first innovation has a value of v1. It can only be
produced by firm A, at an R&D cost of c1 . The second innovation can only be

common in information technology and biotechnology. Without necessarily
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produced by firm B, and only if the first already exists. It has a value of v2
and requires an R&D investment of c2 . We assume that v1+ v2 - c1 - c2 >

funding the tools. If they are not, they can be used by everyone. Aside from
the incentive to innovate, patenting is thus mainly a choice about the

0. It is therefore socially desirable for both innovations to be produced. How

organization of research. The discovery of monoclonal antibodies provides an

can patenting be used to achieve this result?

interesting example. In 1975, two researchers, Kohler and Milstein,

One possibility is to grant a patent for each innovation. This solution

succeeded in using cells to create antibody "bio-factories". They did not

only works, however, if the value of the first innovation is sufficient to cover

patent their invention, although it won them a Nobel prize. As their discovery

its cost. Conversely, if v1 - c1 < 0 , it will not be profitable for firm A to
invest. In this case, since the first innovation is not produced, the second will

had many commercial applications, it was rapidly developed. Hybritech was

not be produced either.

patent, upheld by the courts, enabled the company to exclude competitors

the first to use it to make diagnostic kits, and filed a patent on the kits. The

Therefore, should firm A be given the rights to the posterity of its

that had produced similar kits in the meantime. In that case, exclusivity of

innovation? That would mean that firm B has no guarantee of recovering its

research on a huge technological lead was granted to a single firm, even

investment. Once firm B has invested, it could only make a profit from its

though the major innovation had been discovered by others.

innovation with the agreement of firm A. It is therefore at the mercy of the

Whether in information technology or biotechnology, semiconductors

conditions imposed by firm A, which has every interest in appropriating the

or aeronautics, the cumulative nature of some categories of innovation thus

total profit of the second innovation, or v2 . Knowing that it cannot recover
its investment, firm B will not invest. Lastly, if v1 - c1 < 0 , since firm B will

raises specific intellectual property problems. Because these innovations are

not invest, firm A has no interest in investing either. Thus, by allowing

technologically dependent on one another, it is no longer possible to seek
optimal incentives by considering each innovation in isolation.

holdup, which discourages investment, a broad patent covering later
developments of an innovation is less efficient than several narrow patents.
Cumulative technologies

Cumulative innovations and the optimal patent
What is the optimal patent when innovations are cumulative? One
position is to advocate a "deep" patent, which covers all the innovations that

Major new technologies such as information technology and

follow an initial discovery. By granting the first innovator exclusivity over a

biotechnology are highly cumulative in nature. Software source codes consist

technological lead, the patent gives him the power to organize research

of elementary programming "bricks," which can be used in different software

efficiently [Kitch, 1977]. The threat of litigation for infringement avoids patent

programs. They are also written in program languages that comply with
protocols _ such as TCP-IP for Internet applications _ which are themselves

races and the excessive investments that go with them. In addition, because

innovations. This strong cumulativity explains why the application of

can propose to the patent owner. The owner has every interest in licensing the

intellectual property to software has raised concerns among many

technology or creating research partnerships, when he can benefit from them.

programmers, who have been worried about working under the constant

However, the furthering of research by other firms comes up against

threat of an infringement suit.

the patent is published, other firms can identify new applications, which they

the problem of holdup. To avoid this problem, the owner of the patent and the

Cumulativity in biotechnologies relies on the essential role played by

other firms must enter agreements ex ante, for example by setting up a joint

research tools, which are products of fundamental research. The issue is

company. These agreements lay down the terms under which profits from the

whether these tools are patentable or not. If they are, the research they enable

innovation will be shared before the investment is made. This is not easy

is controlled by the owners of the corresponding patents and contributes to

because the parties must agree at a stage when the results are still highly
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uncertain. In addition, past experience seems to show that deep patents tend
to impede innovation [Merges and Nelson, 1990]. For example, in the electric
light bulb industry, technical progress was severely slowed for the duration of
Edison's patent on the use of carbon filament as a light source. The same thing
happened in aeronautics, after the Wright brothers' patented their system for
stabilizing and controlling airplanes.
The opposite position is not to apply intellectual property when
innovations are cumulative. Innovators are thus put into direct competition,
which reduces their incentive to invest. In return, however, they can draw
freely on all the existing innovations and innovate in turn without having to
worry about infringing a patent. Bessen and Maskin [2000] argue that for
innovators, the loss in revenue due to increased competition is offset by the
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long-term gain of being able to share the available technologies. Open Source
software (or "freeware") is an example that approaches this form of
organization. In many other respects, however, it is a completely original
model of innovation and cannot easily be transposed to other sectors. More
generally, the debate on the optimal depth of patents remains open, because
it is difficult to define clear solutions on the basis of the arguments to date.

Open Source software and
cumulative innovation

software to suit their needs and

teams. In the absence of a formal

needs [Von Hippel, 2002]. Because

hierarchy, freeware programmers

they have a greater awareness of

are grouped around charismatic

the problems to be resolved, they

leaders, generally the creators of

tend to innovate faster than firms

the software, who have the moral

and pay more attention to the

authority to impose their decisions

quality of their technical solutions.

[Lerner and Tirole, 2000].

But this system also has disadvan-

Another difference is the

tages. Freeware is often designed

level of incentive for the program-

for users with advanced computer

mers, which determines the pace of

skills. Functions of little interest to

innovation. Apart from altruism,

programmers,

the main authors of freeware are

interfaces, are often of lower

motivated by career goals or

quality

technical challenges. Freeware also

software. To offset the shortage

changes the direction of technical

of incentives, some freeware

progress. The innovation process is

licenses allow protection by

unusual in that the innovators are

copyright of some innovations at

consumers who remedy their own

the end of the chain.

than

such
in

as

user

proprietary

condition that they make these

This chapter aimed to evaluate the main parameters of patent design _
length, breadth and depth _ on the basis of a simple criterion: social welfare.

The development of Open

freely available to everyone. In this

This method helps define the elements of an optimal patent. A patent of

Source software (also called freely
redistributable software or freewa-

sense, freeware licenses are viral in
nature _ freeware can only be

re), of which the Linux operating

further developed in the form of

limited duration creates more welfare than a patent of infinite duration.
Between the two ends of this reasoning _ patent design and its effect on
welfare _ are economic agents. Indeed, the final effect of patent design

system

freeware.

depends on the reactions of agents and their consequences. The merit of

is

the

most

famous

propose changes or additions, on

freeware

narrow patents only appears in the light of the threat represented by imitators

innovation in the absence of

relies on an original form of

and the strategies the patent owner can adopt to counter them. The innovator

intellectual property. As its name

organization. The constant changes

has every interest in licensing in order to discourage imitators, which also

indicates, freeware is available free

made by programmers require a

saves useless investment in imitation and reduces the deadweight loss by

of charge. But that is not its only

coordination effort to ensure the

creating competition. Similarly, the efficiency of protection of cumulative

feature. The source codes (program

consistency of the whole. In a firm,

texts) can also be accessed by

coordination depends on hierarchi-

innovations depends crucially on the relationship between successive
innovators _ on their willingness to create a joint research and development

anyone. Users can adapt the

cal relationships in programming

company, for example.

example, is a case of cumulative

Innovation

in
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entitled to grant exclusive licenses, which transposes the economic logic of
patents to public research. In 1982 the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit was established to harmonize patent law nationwide. The other effect
of the new court was stronger patent protection. Before 1980, a ruling in favor
of a patent holder had only a 62% chance of being confirmed by a court of
appeal, whereas 88% of verdicts that rejected infringement or patent validity
were upheld by courts of appeal. Between 1982 and 1990, the statistics reflect
a much more favorable attitude to plaintiffs. Ninety percent of rulings

III/Reform and Use of Patents

establishing infringement were upheld, while the proportion of rulings
unfavorable to the plaintiff that were confirmed on appeal decreased to
seventy-two percent [Jaffe, 2000].
In 1973, the Munich Convention, signed outside of the framework of
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Over the past 20 years, patents have come to play an increasingly

the European Community, gave rise to the European patent system. This is

prominent role in OECD economies [OECD, 2004], which in many respects

essentially a centralized procedure for examining inventions at the European

have become "knowledge economies". The number of patent grants has risen

Patent Office (EPO), established for this purpose. The centralized procedure

sharply, more than tripling in the USA between 1980 and 2001, whereas it

ensures that exactly the same patentability criteria are used from one

was practically stable over the previous two decades. Over the same period,

European country to another. It also achieves economies of scale, since filers

innovation has also expanded rapidly. Is there a link between these two

only have to complete the procedure once for all countries. However, this

trends?

European patent did not supersede national patents. Once an invention has
been declared patentable by the EPO, the inventor must then apply to the
countries of his choice to obtain national patents.

Harmonization and strengthening of patent law

This system has serious shortcomings. It encourages innovators to
"shop around" for national patents, neglecting small countries where the

Since the early 1980s, the United States and Europe have

expected profit is not high enough to cover the costs incurred. This leads to

strengthened patent law, sought to harmonize it internationally, and

asymmetry between European countries, which reduces incentives to

extended its coverage to new areas.

innovate. In addition, litigation for patent infringement takes place in
national courts, which multiplies the legal costs for innovators and

Intellectual property reforms in the United States and Europe

exacerbates these discrepancies.
To remedy these problems, in March 2003 the European Council

Until the late 1970s, the U.S. authorities and courts were generally

finally decided to implement a genuine European patent. From 2010,

wary of patents. The reforms introduced in the United States since then

disputes over patents will be centralized in a community jurisdiction attached

denote a change in attitude. The Patent and Trademark Act of 1980, known

to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. There is still one problem, however:

as Bayh-Dole, permits universities and other nonprofit organizations to

patent claims must be translated into all the languages of the European

patent discoveries made in their laboratories. The Act also encourages them

Union. Under the new system, a patent will cost € 23,000, compared with

to transfer patented technologies to the private sector. In particular, they are

€ 28,000 on average today, but compared with € 10,000 and € 16,500
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respectively for a U.S. and a Japanese patent! Since, in practice, English is the

particular, by compelling contracting parties to grant patents on medicines,

universal language of patents, these costs are particularly high. In France, for

the TRIPS Agreement opened the way for the Doha Conference on trade-

example, translations are only consulted in 2% of cases.

related public health issues.

International agreements
On another scale, the globalization of intellectual property law has

Pharmaceutical patents:
the Doha Conference

Agreement of 1994, which relates more generally to "trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights". Three main levels of international integration
can be distinguished. First, a country can grant intellectual property rights
unilaterally to nationals of other countries. Usually, however, these
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agreements imply reciprocity, which represents another level. Every
contracting state to an agreement thus agrees to treat nationals of the other
contracting states in the same way as their own nationals, in return for access
to similar advantages for their own nationals in those other states. These two
types of agreement do not alter the content of national intellectual property
laws. They simply extend their coverage to new categories of persons. The
third level of integration is the harmonization of different national laws by
defining common rules on the content of intellectual property law.
Harmonization may apply to the categories of patentable innovations, the
duration of patents or patent examination procedures.
The Paris Convention, signed in 1883, requires the contracting states
to grant to nationals of the other contracting states the same rights as to their
own innovators. The TRIPS Agreement, negotiated within the framework of
the World Trade Organization, represents a major advance toward the
harmonization of intellectual property laws. For example, the United States
has agreed to extend its legal period of patent validity from 17 to 20 years to
comply with the international standard. The agreement also permits patent
owners to ban the import of counterfeit products. Most importantly, it
includes a general definition of patents. This definition, which adopts U.S.
criteria, broadens the scope of patentable inventions. Unlike various national
laws, it considers that all technical innovations are eligible for minimum
protection, overruling exceptions previously granted to some countries. In

others in other countries, then
reimported and sold at knockdown

been through several stages, from the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property of 1883, which applies to patents only, to the TRIPS

innovations will be produced by

Given

the

considerable

prices in rich countries, which are

investments they require, medicines

their traditional market. How can

are one category of innovation

access to treatment be provided for

where the incentive-giving role of

people in poor countries, while

patents works the best. But it is also

ensuring protection of pharmaceu-

in this category of innovations that

tical

deadweight loss is the cruelest.

investments in OECD countries?

firms'

past

and

future

Indeed, the consumers excluded by

This question was the focus

monopoly pricing are sick people

of the Doha Conference, organized

deprived of the treatment they

by the World Trade Organization in

need, which exists on the market.

November 2001. The concluding

This exclusion is most harshly felt

declaration of the conference gives

in poor countries. For example,

priority to access to treatment, by

AIDS affects 42 million people

recognizing "the gravity of public

around the world, the vast majority

health problems afflicting many

of them in poor countries. Malaria

developing… countries, especially

kills 1 million people in Africa every

those resulting from HIV/AIDS,

year.

tuberculosis, malaria and other
In many cases, a monopoly

epidemics" and indicating that "the

on supply of a drug in a poor

TRIPS Agreement does not and

country is highly unlikely to be a

should not prevent Members from

significant source of profit for an

taking measures to protect public

innovator. It would therefore seem

health." Countries can grant com-

appropriate to make a distinction

pulsory licenses to enable their

between

useful

national industries to produce

patents.

Pharmaceutical

stress

the

risk

and

harmful

that

firms

generic

their

However, this only applies to

versions

of

drugs.
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countries that have a pharmaceuti-

public health emergency, and on

cal industry, such as Brazil, India,

condition that they take measures

South Africa and Thailand.

to prevent generics being shipped

The development of mecha-
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to industrialized countries. These

nisms of parallel imports of

restrictive

generics by other poor countries

imposed by developed countries,

was therefore decisive for the

led by the United States, which

success of the Doha Agreement, as

claimed they were required to

was the list of diseases covered. The

preserve pharmaceutical firms'

discussion of these issues finally

incentives to invest. Sales of drugs

reached a solution at the Cancun

threatened

Conference in September 2003.

generics

Under

poor

evaluated at $50 billion, of which

countries are allowed to import

$17.8 billion for U.S. firms Merck

generic drugs only in cases of

and Pfizer.

this

agreement,

conditions

in

by

the

2007

were

arrival
have

of

been

which now grant patents for software as such. The USPTO is particularly
permissive [Merges, 1999]. The European Office is stricter, but official
recognition of computer programs as patentable innovations is being
examined at European Union level.
On the fringe of software patents, the patentability of "business
methods" was made official in 1998 by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. The ruling in question opened the way for a growing number of
applications to patent business methods in the United States: 1,300 in 1998,
then 2,600 in 1999. In Europe, these applications have been increasing since
the late 1990s, although they are still far below the U.S. level (400
applications all together in 1998 and 1999). The service sector, particularly
financial services and electronic commerce, are the driving forces behind this
trend. We can cite Cybergold's patent on a method for measuring and
rewarding the attention customers pay to advertising, or Amazon's "one click"
patent on the easier online shopping method it developed.
The granting of patents on genetic inventions is undoubtedly the most
significant aspect of the extension of patentability to new categories of

Extending patents to new categories of inventions

inventions. Since the 1980s, patents have been granted in the USA on bacteria
created in laboratories, genetically modified mice and gene sequences. In

National laws generally indicate certain categories of innovations that

Europe, national laws have long been an impediment to patenting living

cannot be patented. In Europe, for example, Article 52 of the Munich

things. The European Directive of July 6, 1998 on the legal protection of

Convention on the Grant of European Patents does not regard scientific

biotechnological inventions nevertheless aligned European law more closely

theories, aesthetic creations, methods of doing business, and computer

with U.S. law. It excludes the human body from patentability, but stipulates

programs as patentable "as such". Article 53 excludes plant and animal

that genes and gene sequences are patentable, even when they are derived

varieties. However, with the boom in new technologies, patentability has been

from the human body, if a process has been developed to isolate them.

extended in practice to new categories of inventions, despite the exemption
rules.

Intellectual property has also been extended to new categories of

The case of computer programs is a perfect illustration of this

invention through the creation of "specially tailored" or "sui generis" rights.
The logic behind these reforms is that existing rights _ patents or copyrights

development. In the early 1980s, the U.S. authorities and courts were hostile

_ are not appropriate protection mechanisms for the inventions in question.

to software patents. Likewise, the Munich Convention stipulates that

In 1984, a sui generis right was created in the United States to protect

computer programs are not patentable. However, in 2002, some 100,000

innovations in the field of semiconductors. In Europe, a directive of 1996

software patents were granted by the United States Patent and Trademark

defines a specific intellectual property right for databases to complement

Office (USPTO) and 30,000 by the EPO. Some of these patents were for

copyright protection, which was not considered sufficient by itself.

embedded software, such as the programs that pilot the cycle on a washing
machine. But, in general, they reflect greater tolerance by patent offices,
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Patents granted by the USPTO, 1963-2001

made intellectual property central to innovation policies. We have yet to
verify whether this is the right choice, i.e., whether the patent law reforms

200000

undertaken in many countries in the 1980s have contributed to promoting
innovation.

100000

Patents in practice
Does intellectual property fulfill its mission? Is the allocation of a
temporary monopoly an efficient way of providing incentives to innovators?
0

If it is, the reforms in favor of patent law that began in the early 1980s should
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To do so we first have to be able to measure innovation. Then we need to
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have shown up in an increase in innovation. This link is difficult to establish.
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Patent applications filed with INPI in France, 1976-2000

explain how the changes in patent law have affected the behavior of firms in
a way that is favorable to innovation. Observation of the role played by

180000

patents in firms' strategies in fact leads us to minimize or even refute the
claim that stronger intellectual property rules encourage innovation.
120000

Exponential increase in patent applications in the past 20 years
The strengthening of intellectual property law since the early 1980s

60000

has been reflected in an increase in the number of patents, particularly in the
United States. The graph below shows the number of patents granted by the
USPTO between 1963 and 2001. Although the general trend of the indicator
is upward over the period, a sharp rise appears at the beginning of the 1980s.
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From that date onwards, patent grants began to increase at a much faster

The example of patent applications filed with the French Institute for

rate. They more than tripled between 1980 and 2001, whereas they had been

Industrial Property (INPI) between 1975 and 2000 shows a comparable trend

practically stable over the previous 20 years. For example, 48,971 patents

for European countries, although it began later. There are indeed close links

were granted in 1963, 66,170 in 1980, and 183,975 in 2001.

between different national patent systems, since there are numerous "twin"
patents protecting the same innovation in Europe and America, and more
broadly in the rest of the world. The table below shows the respective
proportion of American, Japanese and European holders of patents granted
in those three regions in 2001. Except for Japan, which is highly protected,
the globalization of patent applications is striking.
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Patent grants by geographical origin in 2001

conclude at this stage that the higher number of patents is a consequence of
increased innovation.

European Office

Japanese Office

U.S. Office

18,303
53%

5,076
4%

28,459
17%

6,580
19%

109,375
90%

33,223
20%

United States

8,583
25%

6,020
5%

87,607
53%

Other

1,238

4%

1,280
1%

16,750
10%

34,704

121,742

166,039

European
member states
Japan
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The econometrics
patents.

of

the same technical field. Intended
for examiners, these citations must

[from Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002].

refer to the prior art at the time the
patent is drafted. They are also an

Patent

offices

usually

establish and maintain patent data-

important source of economic
information.

bases. Innovators and examiners

The number of patents is an

use these databases to view prior

imperfect measure of innovation,

art, on the basis of which the

because not all patents cover

novelty

of

technologies of equal importance.

innovations are evaluated. The

One way of refining this measure of

information contained in patent

innovation is to weight each patent

Why have patent grants soared? One explanation is the beneficial

databases also represents useful

for the number of citations it

effect of reforms strengthening patent law. The additional protection granted

statistical indicators for economists

generates in subsequent patents.

to innovators has encouraged more investment, leading to the discovery and

and highly practical material for

This technique thus consists in

commercial exploitation of new technological leads. Let us look at the figures

econometrists.

using citations to measure the

TOTAL

Source: Trilateral Statistical Report 2001 [EPO, JPO and USPTO, 2001].

available for the United States. Investment in R&D by U.S. firms employing

and

inventiveness

The number of patents
over

a

given

knowledge externalities created by

fewer than 5,000 people more than doubled between 1987 and 1997 [National

granted

period

the publication of patents. Indeed,

Science Foundation, 1997]. The volume of patent grants has risen in all

provides an interesting measure of

the more the patented knowledge

sectors, but the increase is especially large in new technologies. Patents

innovation, which is otherwise

encourages or facilitates further

granted in information technology and biotechnology more than doubled

difficult to quantify. In addition, as

research, the more the patent will

between 1990 and 2000. The 100 top research-performing American

the referenced patents contain

be cited in patents stemming from

universities tripled their annual income from patents between 1984 and 1994

information about the identity of

that research. However, as for

[Cohen et al., 2000]. Technological progress is therefore one possible cause

the owner, measures of innovation

innovations, not all citations have

of the significant increase in the number of patents granted over the past 20

can be broken down by country,

the same value. For example, only

years. This also highlights the pioneering role of the United States in the

industry or firm.

half correspond to a genuine flow

development of new technologies such as information technology, electronics

Every patent also contains

and biotechnology. However, technological progress is not a sufficient

references to previous patents in

explanation. R&D investment certainly rose at the same time as the number
of patents, but does not alone account for the entire increase. At most, we can

of knowledge and only a quarter to
a decisive flow of knowledge.
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technologies of strategic importance, which are central to a firm's
competitive advantage, a patent portfolio can provide extra security, by

In fact patents only seem to play an incentive role in a small

protecting the coded elements of the technology, while the related know-

number of industries. Empirical studies show that the additional profits

how is protected by trade secrecy [Somaya, 2001]. Philips' recognized

generated by a patent only have a positive effect on R&D expenditure in

world leadership in optical technologies, for example, consists essentially

pharmaceuticals and biotechnologies [Arora et al., 2001]. These industries

of the experience of the company's laboratory engineers. Patents only

are characterized by extremely high R&D costs and by the difficulty of

represent the visible tip of this technological capital, and mainly offer a

preventing infringers from imitating innovations. In the pharmaceutical

way for the company to organize its relations with the rest of the industry-

industry, a new drug is only marketed at the end of a long process, which

competitors, but also partners under license. The main function of patents

begins with general research and ends with clinical trials on patients

is thus to facilitate trade, rather than to provide incentives to innovate.

before marketing. A total investment of around $1 billion is required to
develop some 1,000 drugs, of which only one will be marketed in the end.
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Given these enormous costs, it would be disastrous for a firm if its
innovation were to be copied by a competitor. Intellectual property

Patents facilitate trade in technologies. Empirical studies show that

protection is vital to return on investment when it is undertaken by the

license agreements are more common in industries where intellectual

private sector.

property rights confer effective protection, such as biotechnologies and

This observation cannot be generalized, however. Several surveys of

chemicals [Arora et al., 2001]. The chemicals sector is a good illustration.

R&D managers from U.S. firms [Cohen et al., 2000] have highlighted their

Far from being used exclusively by patent holders, most innovations are

lack of faith in patents as a way of protecting their innovations. Firms cite

licensed to other firms in the industry. The diffusion of technology is

trade secrecy as the most effective form of protection, ahead of patents. In

achieved through a vast licensing market, which gives the whole sector

the most recent survey, patents are only considered effective protection for

access to the most advanced technologies. In the case of a process

35% of product innovations and 23% of process innovations. By contrast,

innovation, innovators see an advantage in granting licenses to their

being the first to market an innovation is regarded as sufficient for 53% of

competitors. Each firm reduces its costs, and the benefit of all these cost

product innovations and 38% of process innovations, and secrecy is

reductions finally returns to the innovator via royalties. Furthermore, by

considered effective in 51% of cases, both for product and process

granting licenses to its competitors, a technological leader can avoid a

innovations. Other studies, conducted in Europe, [Lanjouw, 1998;

costly patent race. Indeed, if competitors have access to the best

Schankerman, 1998; Combe and Pfister, 2002] confirm these results. They

technology, they have less incentive to invest in research to overtake it.

estimate the value of patent protection at between 15% and 25% of R&D

The leader thus also avoids having to overinvest to maintain its lead, and

expenditure. In other words, patents seem to be inefficient at guaranteeing

at the same time enhances social welfare [Gallini, 1984].

innovators return on their investment.
The protection conferred by patents must therefore be considered
secondary or complementary to other types of protection, namely secrecy
and the advantage of being the first innovator in a market. For
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The market in chemical technologies

firms specialized in new printed circuit designs and licensed their innovations
to larger firms. The small firms took advantage of the allocative role of

Companies

Revenues Total number of
Average
R&D
1988
licenses (including estimated expenditure
($ million)
internal to the
revenue per
in 1988
corporation)
license
($ million)
(1980-90)
($ million)

enabled them to attract capital by protecting their first innovations.
Intellectual property plays a similar role in biotechnology. By making
it easier to achieve a return on investment and to obtain financing from
venture capitalists and the capital markets, intellectual property has

3,539
7,453
8,324

174 (45)
144 (31)
143 (37)

233
204
192

120
590
59

11,848
21,125
2,237

172 (71)
148 (55)
88 (29)

183
168
107

773
1,020
72

4,300
2,500
10,802

78 (23)
77 (22)
72 (28)

99.5
99.5
79.6

?
?
632

Texaco (US)
BASF (Ger)
Exxon (US)
Mitsui Toatsu
(J)

1,500
21,543
9,892
2,991

53 (9)
82 (45)
84 (49)
50 (15)

79.6
66.9
63.3
63.3

?
1,010
551
?

Contrary to its intended purpose, intellectual property is paradoxically

Hoechst (Ger)
Du Pont (US)

21,948
19,608

78 (44)
99 (66)

61.5
59.7

1,363
1,319

Patents can actually be a powerful means for some firms to block

Air Liquide (F)
Monsanto (US)
Union Carbide
(US)

encouraged the entry of private agents [Henry et al. 2003]. On the basis of
their intellectual property rights, these innovating firms set up cooperation
arrangements with traditional agents, namely universities and public
laboratories. They also license their discoveries to downstream sectors such

Shell (UK)
ICI (UK)
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patents in order to specialize. The reinforcement of patent law has also

Air Products
(US)

as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and seeds. However, the USPTO's generosity
has triggered patent races and the multiplication of rights over genes and
gene fragments. As a result, potential innovators are forced to acquire a large
number of licenses in order to work, at the price in particular of high

Amoco (US)
Phillips (US)

Rhône-Poulenc
(F)

transaction costs [Henry et al. 2003]. Indeed, several gene fragments are
required to produce a therapeutic protein or a diagnostic kit [Heller and
Eisenberg, 1998]. Similarly, research requires access to protected databases,
for which fees are increasingly charged [Maurer and Scotchmer, 1998b].

Based on Arora and Fosturi [2000]

becoming an impediment to innovation.
A legal weapon

technological development. Unlike cooperative information sharing, patent
portfolios create a barrage of intellectual property rights, designed to exclude
competitors from particular avenues of research or from the market
altogether [Barton, 1997]. By constantly filing new patents to prevent the

By allocating ownership rights over innovations, patents also enable
vertical specialization. In the chemicals industry, some firms have specialized

entry of new competitors, Xerox, the inventor of the photocopier, succeeded
in maintaining its monopoly for years.

in R&D activities. They derive their revenues mainly from their patent

These strategies based on patent portfolios are particularly common in

portfolios by licensing their innovations to major corporations more geared

sectors such as electronics and information technology. Innovations in those

toward production. Similarly, in the 1980s small-sized new entrants played a

sectors are constantly being improved on and combined to produce

growing role in the semiconductor industry [Hall & Ziedonis, 2001]. These

marketable final products. The hard drive of a personal computer, for
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example, includes innovations protected by hundreds of patents. The
different patents required to manufacture the hard drive belong to different
owners. The patent holders must therefore cooperate by granting cross
licenses to each other. A firm's bargaining power relative to the others
depends on the size of its patent portfolio. The dispute between Intel and
Intergraph in 1998 is enlightening here. Intergraph, a company that
manufactures workstations, sued Intel on the grounds that Intel's
microprocessors infringed some of its patents. In retaliation, Intel invoked its
intellectual property rights to bar Intergraph from continuing to use its
technology. In other words, Intergraph sued Intel for infringing its patents, so
Intel prohibited Intergraph from using its trade secrets _ which Intergraph
needed to build systems compatible with Intel's.
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The determinants
patent litigation

of

of a trial and appeal is estimated at

also put them in a better position

$1.5

for negotiating settlements, in the

$800,000 for an out-of-court

form of cross license agreements. It

settlement. Of some 1,600 patent

is harder for startups to enforce

lawsuits filed each year, only 100

their rights, despite the strategic

go as far as a court verdict [Lemley,

importance of patents for them.

2001]. A dispute is thus an

Without patent portfolios, they lose

opportunity to clarify the relation-

out

of

ship between two firms before

reputation and bargaining chip

negotiating the amount of royalties,

[Lanjouw

for example.

on

both
and

the

effects

Schankerman,

million,

compared

with

2001]. A survey conducted in the

The classic line of defense

biotechnology sector revealed that

for an infringement defendant is to

technological area, for which there

55% of small firms regard litigation

contest the validity of the patent at

are few legal precedents.

as an impediment to innovation,

issue. By entering an agreement,

compared with only 33% of large

the parties avoid the risk of the

firms [Lerner, 1995].

court overruling the patent. The

Litigation is also more likely
In an ideal world, all players

patent portfolios. Their portfolios

when the stakes are high. Based on

would know exactly what their

U.S.

and

In general, legal action is

rights were and there would never

Schankerman [2001] showed that

rarely initiated and even less often

the

be any litigation because the

litigation for infringement is more

taken to term, because firms often

guaranteed by the patent, rather

outcome of any legal action would

common when the innovations

have an interest in settling to avoid

than risk the appearance of new

be known in advance. The future

concerned are at the base of a chain

high court costs [Crampes and

competitors

losers would have every interest in

of cumulative innovations, i.e.,

Langinier, 2002]. In the United

cancelled and losing their profits

saving on the cost of pointless

when they represent a technological

States, the median cost to each side

for good.

litigation, by complying from the

lead. By taking legal action, patent

outset with the expected verdicts.

owners may also be attempting to

Empirical studies highlight the general effect of patent portfolio

By

contrast,

the

data,

Lanjouw

parties will thus choose to settle in
shade

of

if

the

the

monopoly

patent

is

day-to-day

establish a reputation. Indeed,

strategies in the semiconductor sector [Hall & Ziedonis, 2001].

workings of real courts stem from

patents are cited more often when

Semiconductor firms say they put more faith in secrecy and the first

the ambiguity of law, which creates

they

in

innovator's advantage than in patents to protect their innovations. Their

litigious situations. The likelihood

litigation. Such a reputation also

propensity to patent nevertheless doubled between 1982 and 1992, from 0.3

of litigation is higher when the

helps a firm enforce its other

to 0.6 patents per million dollars spent on R&D. In microprocessors, 25,000

parties have different expectations

patents. Consequently, infringe-

patents were granted in the United States between 1988 and 1998. In 1998, a

about the outcome. This is the case

ment litigation benefits large firms

total of 4,714 patents were registered, compared with fewer than 1,500 ten

when patents concern a new

more, because they have large

years earlier. This apparent paradox between discourse and practice stems

have

been

involved
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from the increase in patent portfolio strategies from the early 1980s onwards.

rewards the quantity of applications processed, rather than the quality of

As the authorities changed their attitude to patents, large companies started

examination [Merges, 1999], which is an additional incentive to be lenient on

systematically filing for patents to reduce the risk of being blocked by

applications. By contrast, the EPO can be considered relatively efficient.

someone else's patent and to be able to negotiate access to existing

After examination by the patent office, patent grants can be opposed

technologies on the best terms. Roger Smith, an intellectual property law

by third parties, either with the office or in court. This system is imperfect in

counsel with IBM explained in 1990: "The IBM patent portfolio gains us the
freedom to do what we need to do through cross-licensing _ it gives us access

that no competitor has an interest in incurring the cost of opposition in the

to the inventions of others that are the key to rapid innovation. Access is far

opposed by firms accused of infringement in court, and not at the level of the

more valuable to IBM than the income it receives from its 9,000 active

patent offices. Here again, the European system is probably more efficient,

patents. There's no direct calculation of this value, but it's many times larger

since the rate of opposition in Europe is more than three times higher than

than the royalty income, perhaps an order of magnitude larger."

the rate of reexamination in the United States [Graham et al., 2001].

place of the others. As a consequence, the validity of patents is usually only

Information technology is another complex technology, where the
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strategic role of patent portfolios could stifle the incentive effect usually

A comparison of their procedures suggests that the EPO is better

expected from intellectual property. As we have seen, patent offices started

equipped than the USPTO to sort patent applications. This helps explain the

granting software patents in the 1980s. Since 2000, they have risen to 30,000

exponential increase in the volume of patents granted in the United States,

in Europe and 100,000 in the United States. Since this sector has seen major

and the new role played by patents in firms' strategies. More generally,

technological progress in the absence of strong intellectual property rights,

reforms to strengthen intellectual property have sometimes perverted it.

many fear that holdup, in the form of infringement litigation, could dissuade

Beyond their incentive role, patents have become a strategic weapon that is

many innovators that do not have patent portfolios to defend themselves.

pushing market competition into the courts. Excessive generosity by patent

Indeed, most software patents are held by firms in the semiconductor sector.

offices and courts toward patent filers and owners can encourage firms to

IBM alone holds 8% of these patents.

seek intellectual property rights for the economic power they confer,
independently of their R&D efforts. These strategies, which consist in

The role of patent offices

building patent portfolios to exclude competitors from technological leads,
also risk stifling innovation, by imposing a cost on it. They create stable

Patent offices act as a filter. Their role is to examine patent
applications on the basis of patentability criteria _ novelty, inventiveness,
and technical feasibility _ in order to exclude minor or irrelevant innovations,
thus avoiding unjustified monopolies. Failure to enforce the criteria can
encourage firms to seek rents by patenting techniques that are already
commonly used or ideas that are far too general. It is therefore crucial for
patent office examiners to apply the criteria correctly. This is not always the
case, however, particularly in the United States, owing to certain
organizational factors at the patent office.
USPTO examiners have to justify their decisions only when they reject
a patent application [Lemley, 2001]. Furthermore, their performance system

sectors dominated by a few incumbents and closed to new entrants other than
firms specialized in R&D.
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author, in practice it lasts for 70 years after the author's death in both Europe
and the United States.
How does economic theory address the main legal characteristics of
copyright? What is the purpose of copyright? Is it economically justified? Can
it be improved? To answer these questions, economic analysis takes two main
complementary lines of enquiry. The first is the tradeoff between creation and
diffusion, which characterizes intellectual property law in general. The aim of
this approach is to ascertain in what ways and to what extent this tradeoff

IV/Economic Analysis of Copyright

applies to copyright. The second is to analyze transactions. In this approach,
copyright is viewed as a basic element of economic organization, equivalent
to an ordinary property right. After explaining these two theoretical
approaches, we apply them to the reality of literary and artistic creation.
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Copyright protects a wide variety of literary and artistic works, ranging

Digital technology is a particularly enlightening test in this respect.

from essays to photographs, from plays to music, from airport bestsellers to
priceless works of art. To enjoy copyright protection, a work must be original
_ in other words, it must originate from the author. The list of protected

Incentive and access

works is therefore not closed. It grows as new techniques produce new forms
of literary and artistic creation. In the past, for example, the scope of

The first function of copyright is protection against piracy, i.e., the

copyright was extended to include photographic and cinematographic works.

identical reproduction of a work by a third party. It made it possible to control

More recently it has come to protect software.

the publication of the first printed books. This function is also the most

What does this protection cover? Under the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, copyright applies to the expression

frequently studied by economists, who consider it as central to the tradeoff
between incentive and access that justifies copyright.

of works, in whatever mode or form. It thus gives authors an exclusive right

Piracy is sometimes organized on a large scale, with a small number of

over the reproduction, performance, adaptation and translation of their work.

agents producing and distributing copies. This was true of the counterfeiting

In addition to these economic rights, which are of most interest to

printers denounced by Diderot in 1767 and still applies to some counterfeiting

economists, are moral rights, which vary from country to country. At

industries operating in some developing countries. Today, however, copies

international level, the Berne Convention grants authors the right to claim

are usually made by consumers, with a large number of agents each making a

authorship of their work and to object to any modification of it that would be

small number of copies. In this case, the means of reproduction and diffusion

prejudicial to their honor or reputation. By contrast, that provision is absent

are more complex.

from the TRIPS Agreement. Other moral rights, such as the French "right to

Information is said to have been reproduced vertically [Shy, 2000]

rescind" (droit de retrait [Y1] ), allowing authors to set a time limit on the

when each consumer makes a copy for the next consumer. If the quality of a

commercial diffusion of their work, are not recognized in all countries. In the

copy is inferior to that of the original, the value of the copies diminishes at

United States, copyright obeys a primarily economic logic, and moral rights

every stage, until it falls below the unit cost of producing them. There comes

are reduced to a minimum. Lastly, duration is also an aspect of copyright

a point where it is no longer worthwhile making any further copies. Audio and

protection. Set by the Berne Convention at 50 years after the death of the

video recordings can only be copied a limited number of times by analogue
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Diderot on counterfeiting

cheaper edition to the better one.
The counterfeiter scarcely became
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"Indeed […] skilful printers

any richer, and the entrepreneurial,

[…] had no sooner published an

clever man, defeated by the inept,

edition of a book, which they had

grasping man who deprived him

prepared at great expense and

unexpectedly of a gain commensu-

whose craftsmanship and judicious

rate with his care, expense, labor

choice brought them success, than

and the risks of his trade, lost

the same book was reprinted by

his enthusiasm and remained

incompetents who possessed none

discouraged.

of their talents. The latter, having

[…]

engaged no expense, could sell

The public certainly appea-

their copies at a lower price, and

red to benefit from competition,

profited from the monies advanced

since the man of letters could

and late nights spent by the former,

purchase a poorly bound book for a

without incurring any of his risks.

trifle, and the skilful printer, after

What happened? What was bound

having struggled for some time

to happen and what will always

with the delay in income and the

happen:

ensuing discomfort, lowered the

Competition made the more

price of his own edition. […] But do

noble enterprise ruinous. It took

not be mistaken, sir, [for this

twenty years to sell an edition,

benefit] was only momentary and

whereas half that time would have

[…] proved detrimental to the

been sufficient to sell two. While

discouraged profession and preju-

the counterfeit was inferior to the

dicial to men of letters and to

original edition, as was ordinarily

literature itself."
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Information can also be reproduced horizontally when copies are
made from the original only. This is typical of reproductions of a painting by
a famous artist. Another example of horizontal reproduction is when, in a
library, each user makes his own photocopy of a journal article. Lastly,
reproduction is described as "mixed" when copies are made both horizontally
and vertically.
When studying the economics of piracy before the digital revolution
(see infra), the usual theoretical definition of information as a public good
was not considered relevant. Because of the decrease in quality when paper or
tape copies are made vertically, information in fact becomes a finite resource,
and therefore a rival good. Furthermore, the diffusion of creations by piracy
is not free _ it has a cost, depending on the media on which the copies are
made (paper, video tape, CD or DVD). These factors may limit diffusion by
piracy, but do not prevent it all together. Independently of problems of
imitation, an appropriate intellectual property right is therefore needed to
control the publication of a work.
Copyright and piracy
Because it protects the expression of works, copyright is an
appropriate tool for combating piracy. Indeed, "expression" covers any
identical reproduction, such as a radio broadcast of a piece of music or a new
edition of a novel. The copyright owner thus controls any commercial
exploitation of reproductions of the work, which provides the highest
incentive to create.
More surprisingly, copyright can also achieve a gain in allocative
efficiency. This is the case when the rights owner has a superior technology

the case, the counterfeiter sold his
book at a low price and the impecu-

Diderot, Letter on the book trade

nious man of letters preferred the

[1767].

for reproducing works, particularly because of economies of scale. It is better,
for example, to use a printing press than a photocopier to produce a magazine
in a large number of copies. If the legal reproductions of the work are less

reproduction. Similarly, a document that is the result of several successive
photocopies is hard to read. By contrast, digital reproduction of information
makes identical copies possible. It therefore lends itself to unlimited vertical
reproduction.

expensive to produce than pirate copies, it may be preferable to use them,
even if this accentuates the deadweight loss [Landes and Posner, 1989].
The rights owner's technological superiority in relation to pirates
can also be artificial. The author has an interest in selling the originals in
formats that are more difficult to copy. This might be done, for example, by
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printing a book in colors that do not photocopy well, or by producing music

therefore buy his original at a price equal to the sum of the profit (15) and the

CDs with added background noise that only becomes audible when the disk is

utility (20) that he will derive from it, i.e. p=35. The final profit for the

copied onto a cassette [Novos and Waldman, 1987]. The resulting increase in

producer of the originals is 20+35=55, which is the sum of the utility of all

the cost and/or decrease in the quality of the copy will dissuade some

the consumers of originals and of copies.

consumers from making copies and encourage them to buy originals. There is

The producer will only obtain this profit, however, if he can charge the

no gain in allocative efficiency here. Physical protection is simply a

prices he wants to A and B. In fact, B has an interest in buying his original at

complement to copyright to remedy the non excludability of information. It

the same price as A, which would enable him to keep the profits of the

can be seen in terms of the traditional tradeoff between incentive and access.

photocopies for himself. But if the producer charges a uniform price of p=35
for every original, he will lose A as a customer, and his profit will fall to 35.
Thus, by improving the diffusion of a creation, copies benefit the

Indirect appropriability

creators of originals if they can practice price discrimination.
Rather than preventing it, copyright can also be used to control the
production of copies by third parties. This applies in particular if the producer
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of the original can appropriate the value-the consumer utility-created by the
copies. This is the case, for example, when a library pays a journal for the

Copyright protection is not restricted to copies of original works. The

photocopies its users make. This process is called "indirect appropriability"

Berne Convention stipulates that, in addition to the reproduction of works,

[Liebowitz, 1985]. The copies generate profit for the creators, and therefore

copyright confers a monopoly on their translation, adaptation and

an incentive to create. Incentive and access are thus reconciled. Indirect

performance. These three forms of expression are different from mere

appropriability is only possible, however, if the producer of the originals can

reproduction in that they involve an additional element of creativity. A

practice price discrimination between direct consumers and consumers that

translation of a novel is generally better if the translator has taken the trouble

make copies.

to render the style of the text, rather than translating word for word. A reader

The mechanism of indirect appropriability can be illustrated by a

who knows languages will prefer to read a novel in the original, since he

simple example. Let us suppose that reading a journal article generates utility

knows that a translation is already in some respects a different book.

of U(0)=20 if the reader has access to the original an that each photocopy

Similarly, the screen adaptation of a novel or a play requires creative input by

reduces the value of the document by half. The reader therefore enjoys utility

the filmmaker. Lastly, the performance of a play, however famous, will be a

of U(1)=10

flop if the director and actors are mediocre.

with a photocopy of the original, and U(2)=5

with a

photocopy of a photocopy. Each photocopy costs C= 4. It is therefore not
worthwhile making more than two successive photocopies, since U(3)<C.

Whatever form it takes, a derivative creation of an original work thus
creates a new type of use and poses the incentive/access tradeoff for literary

Let us also suppose that the producer of the original only has access to

and artistic works covered by copyright in new terms. Let us take the example

two consumers, A and B. Consumer B is in contact with consumer C, who

of a playwright. Should he only be given exclusivity over the reproduction of

knows consumer D. In this case, A buys an original at a price of

his work on paper? Or, as stipulated in the Berne Convention, should he also

p=U(0)=20. But what price is B willing to pay for an original? B can sell a
copy to C, who can in turn sell a copy of his copy to D at a price of p=U(2)=
5 . B can then sell the first photocopy of the article to C for a price of
U(2)+U(1)=15 , or the sum of C's personal utility and profit. B can

be given rights over the performance of his work, with the consequence of
putting it out of reach for amateur theatre troupes for example? Rights that
are too narrow can discourage creation. But if they are too broad, they can
hinder the diffusion of works.
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This second point takes on considerable importance when several

TRIPS Agreement sets the term for copyright at 70 years after the author's

rights are involved [Moureau and Sagot-Duvauroux, 2002]. If different
people hold rights to the same creation, each has a "right of veto" over the

death, whereas a patent lasts for only 20 years. This choice is based on a
simple argument _ the creator's lower profit in each period is compensated by

common work. Moreover, even if they agree to the diffusion of the work, if

a higher number of periods, to enable him to recover his costs and provide

each rights holder demands high royalties, diffusion will cease to be

him with sufficient incentive [Landes and Posner, 2002]. However, this

profitable. The tragedy of the anticommons, highlighted by Eisenberg and

argument is weakened if copyright covers derivative works. In this case, the

Heller [1998] in the field of patents, therefore also concerns copyright. In the

duration of the right also affects the cost of subsequent works. One has to wait

United States, the screening of the movie Twelve Monkeys was suspended

longer for a work to enter the public domain, and therefore to be able to use

after 28 days when an artist claimed that an armchair that appeared in the

it freely for new creations. For this reason, setting breadth then duration is

movie resembled the sketch of a chair that he had designed [Lessig, 2002].

unsatisfactory. There is another possible justification. The success of a work

More generally, excessive protection of derivative works by copyright

is uncertain and may come many years after the first edition. A long copyright

can be counterproductive. If copyright were extended to the ideas contained

is therefore an additional guarantee for the author or his beneficiaries of

in works, as is the case for patents, it would impede creation by increasing its

obtaining the profit from his work, even if this is delayed [Diderot, 1767;

cost [Landes and Posner, 1989]. Works protected by copyright reuse many

Landes and Posner, 2002].

existing ideas and can thus be compared to cumulative innovations.

In practice, the scope and the duration of copyright can also be

Consequently, stronger protection, extended to ideas, could represent a

explained by the influence wielded by interest groups. Originally set at 14

considerable impediment to creation, since each author would have to

years, copyright in the United States has been gradually extended to the

remunerate the owners of the ideas that he draws on. Pop music would

current 70 years after the author's death.

probably never have enjoyed the success it has if exclusivity had been granted
to the Beatles. Similarly, the protection of philosophical ideas would have a
devastating effect on their development.

Disney, Mickey Mouse
and the Sonny Bono Act

40

[Lessig,

2002]!

Opponents of these reforms ascribe
this

What is the optimal scope of copyright?

years

legislative

inflation

to

The Sonny Bono Copyright

lobbying, most notably by Disney.

Term Extension Act, passed on

They point out that, if it weren't for

Copyright protection was initially concerned with piracy. The

October 27, 1999, extends the term

the Sonny Bono Act, the first

extension of copyright to derivative works and ultimately to the underlying

of US copyright from 50 to 70 years

drawing of Mickey Mouse would

ideas enables authors to reap more of the benefits of their works, but it also

after the author's death. This

have entered the public domain in

increases the cost of subsequent creations. As a consequence, to encourage

reform, which appears to offer

2003, closely followed by Donald

creation, it is preferable to limit the scope of protection to below the level that

more incentive to creators, at the

Duck and Goofy. Indeed, the Act

maximizes each author's profit [Landes and Posner, 1989]. This, combined

expense of the diffusion of works,

sets forth that the extension of the

with the traditional impediment to diffusion that monopoly power

has sparked a major controversy.

term of copyright also applies to

represents, justifies a relatively narrow copyright in practice. The criterion of

The Act is in fact only the latest

existing creations, which clearly

"expression" does encompass derivative works, in addition to piracy.

episode in a series of eleven

cannot be justified by the incentive

However it does not protect ideas, as a patent would.

extensions of copyright duration in

function of copyright. Its oppo-

Does the relative narrowness of copyright explain its length? The
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nents cite the powerful economic

publish classics as soon as they

interests

notably

enter the public domain. He

Hollywood, which represents one

intended to add works from the

of the United States' leading export

1920s to his catalogue, such as

items.

Winnie the Pooh by A. A. Milne and

at

stake,

Opponents of the Sonny

Three Stories and Ten Poems by

Bono Act decry the risk of

Ernest Hemingway, the rights of

privatization and stifling of culture.

which are due to expire shortly.

The Act was contested in court by

However, since the Supreme Court

Eric Elder, creator of a website that

upheld the Sonny Bono Act in

distributes old, rare and out-of-

January 2003, Mr. Elder will now

print books. Elder's strategy is to

have to wait until 2019.
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who can sell his right to the highest bidder enjoys maximum incentive to
create. A publishing contract, which shares rights between creators and
publishers, is a good illustration of this type of transaction. The author
entrusts the reproduction and distribution of his work to a publisher in return
for payment. This division of labor _ creation on one side, production and
distribution on the other _ produces a gain in efficiency when the work can
be exploited at lesser cost by a specialized agent. Few writers are willing to
invest in printing equipment and most do not know how to use it or to supply
bookstores. However, beyond the principle of this division of labor, the terms
of the contract must be set. Is there an optimal publishing contract? It should
guarantee maximum profit for the author, to optimize the incentive function
of copyright. The key parameter of a publishing contract is therefore the way
the profits from production and distribution of the work are to be shared. The
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contract determines the share of each contracting party and how it will be

Copyright and industrial organization
Apart from offering incentives to create, copyrights underpin a form of
industrial organization based on the exchange and exploitation of property
rights. This allocative function of rights reconciles incentive and access: by
facilitating the diffusion of works through exchange, copyrights increase the
profits of creators and therefore the incentives to create. This can be deduced
from Coase's Theorem, according to which granting property rights
guarantees efficient allocation in the absence of transaction costs. However,
since in real life situations these costs must be taken into account, the legal
system must be designed to minimize the production and transaction costs
stemming from the exploitation of creations. This aim is reflected in the
organizational choices of economic agents with regard to copyrights. It also
justifies certain legal adjustments to copyright, such as the fair use doctrine
in the United States.
Publishing contracts and profit-sharing
When copyrights are granted on original creations they can be
allocated subsequently to the agents that value them the most. The author

calculated. The author's royalties can either be a fixed amount agreed in
advance or be proportional to sales. With royalties that are a percentage of
sales, the auctor economicus has every interest in writing a bestseller. If his
payment is fixed, his only motivation to produce quality work is a concern for
reputation. In turn, the distributor will have more incentive to maximize sales
if its remuneration is proportional to sales.
The profit-sharing mode has other effects, which must also be taken
into consideration in a publishing contract. Variable royalties paid to the
author can have indirect consequences that are unfavorable to the contracting
parties [Watt, 2000]. Unlike a fixed payment at the outset, royalties
proportional to sales increase the unit cost of the originals for the publisher.
This prompts the publisher to raise its monopoly price. However, raising the
price will reduce the total profit to be shared between author and publisher.
Ultimately, the classic problem of a double margin is thus to the author's
disadvantage. Furthermore, the unit cost of copies remains stable, while the
price of the originals increases, which encourages piracy.
Although variable royalties affect the sales price of the originals in a
way that is unfavorable to the author, they nevertheless enable him to control
that price. Theoretically, the author can thus appropriate all the profit
generated by the work, by combining fixed and variable payments [Watt,
2000]. To do this, he must set variable royalties so as to obtain the highest
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price from the publisher, and then recover the total profit in a fixed payment.
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distributor until a certain date, after which it returns to the author.

This is, of course, unrealistic. It implies that the author is in a position to

This practice, which can be ascribed to an unequal relationship that is

impose the terms of the contract. Above all, it implies that he has advance

favorable to the publisher, is paradoxical in the light of economic logic

knowledge of demand for the originals. Raising that assumption helps us

[Liebowitz, 1987]. Indeed, it would make economic sense for risk to be

understand the features of standard publishing contracts.

covered entirely by distributors, be they book publishers, record producers or
television networks. They are big enough to cope with the uncertainty of

Publishing contracts and risk-sharing

demand. Portfolio strategies are their main way of diversifying risk. A book
publisher signs a large number of contracts with different authors and can
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The introduction of risk, in the form of uncertainty over future

thus offset a commercial failure with a success. This is a publisher's backlist,

demand for originals, sheds new light on the economic function of a

i.e., all the rights it owns on existing works, particularly on strong-selling

publishing contract [Liebowitz, 1987]. This type of uncertainty is extremely

titles, which gives it sufficient guarantees to take the risk of working with a

high with intellectual property rights. It is very difficult to predict the success

new, unknown author. By contrast, an artist is entirely dependent on the

of a new novel or a new song. Unlike other goods, comparisons of similar

success of the work he produces himself. Lastly, distributors have access to

articles are impossible, since the protected creations are by definition unique!

the most complete information on demand. They are therefore in the best

At best, the work can be compared to a close substitute. This technique may

position to evaluate and treat the risk associated with a new work.

be relatively accurate for romance novels, but it is much more tenuous for
novels in the running for literary prizes, for example. The uncertainty of

Collective copyright management organizations

demand highlights an essential function of copyright. By granting control
over a good, a property right attaches the associated risk and profit.

Transaction costs are a key factor in the exploitation of copyrights. The

Transferring a property right in exchange for a fixed amount transfers not

first of these are enforcement costs. Indeed, legal protection against copying

only control of the good, but also the risk relating to the uncertain income

is ineffectual if works can be pirated with impunity. The rights owner,

that the good will generate. The owner of a copyright will reap the reward of

whether the author or the distributor, must therefore spend money to

the commercial success of a creation. He must also accept the risk of failure.

monitor and enforce their copyright. Since a distributor usually has more

This risk may be too high for an author. A publishing contract is thus a way to

financial clout than an isolated author, sharing rights through a publishing

share risk, by transferring all or some of the copyrights to the publisher.

contract is also a way to minimize enforcement costs. However, the partial

There are several ways to share risk between the creator and the

transfer of rights also has a cost in itself, that of drafting and enforcing the

distributor. One possibility is for the author not to transfer rights, but to pay

contract. For example, an art photographer who does not want his distributor

a fixed amount to the publisher, who is thus assimilated to an employee or

to authorize the reproduction of his photographs on packaging or wallpaper

subcontractor. The author will thus be the sole beneficiary of a commercial

must stipulate this in the contract between them and subsequently check that

success, but he will also have to meet all expenses in the event of failure. A

the terms of the contract are respected. More generally, the transaction costs

second option is for the author to sell all the rights to the distributor for a

relating to exploitation of a copyright increase in line with the number of

fixed price. The distributor is then free to keep the work for himself, rent it

agents to which the work is diffused.

out or sell it again. He will also have to cover all the associated risks. A

These various transaction costs reduce the allocative efficiency of

standard publishing contract represents an intermediate solution between

copyright. They can even cancel it out all together if they are higher than the

these two options. The copyright is shared over time: it belongs to the

gains in the deal. It is therefore beneficial to minimize them. According to
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economic theory, costs of transaction through the market should be

copyrights held by different owners. In this situation, each owner tends to

compared to the operating costs of a hierarchical, centralized organization,

demand too high a price for resources to be allocated efficiently [Depoorter

which is often more efficient. Collective copyright management

and Parisi, 2002]. For example, this book would not have been published if

organizations, which group creators from the same artistic field, are an

we had had to negotiate the prior authorization of all the authors cited. These

excellent illustration of this. In the United States, the American Society for

situations reflect a failure of the copyright system itself. Indeed, the exclusive

Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) manages rights for these three

allocation of the profit of a work to one agent prohibits access by others,

groups. Bodies like these handle most of the exploitation of copyright and

without it being profitable for that agent. To resolve this problem, limits must

associated transaction costs on behalf of authors. They fulfill several

be set on copyright.

functions: they grant user licenses; they negotiate, collect and redistribute

The doctrine of fair use, specific to United States law, defines

royalties to authors; and they enforce copyright by suing infringers

situations where a copyrighted work can be used without the permission of its

[Hollander, 1984].

author. Drawn from United States judicial decisions, this doctrine has no real

These functions are less expensive when they are grouped. Thus,

equivalent in Europe. Certain rules specific to other national laws

collective organizations can grant blanket user licenses to their clients,

nevertheless obey a similar logic. In France, there are exceptions to economic

whereas a single author is limited to his own works. A radio station only has

rights. The "right to cite" (droit de citation), for example, allows free

to make one transaction with ASCAP to be able to broadcast a large number

quotation from a copyrighted work, as long as explicit reference is made to

of music titles. Compared with a completely decentralized form of

the creator. In the United Kingdom, the right to parody allows people to

organization, where radio stations would have to negotiate the broadcast of

pastiche a work, without fear of infringing copyright. The fair use doctrine

every title with its respective author, centralized management of rights

covers very different uses of works: criticism, commentary, teaching and

achieves a considerable saving on transaction costs. Similarly, collective

research. The decisive element is that the doctrine allows a work to be used in

copyright management organizations benefit from economies of scale by

situations where high transaction costs would otherwise have made it

contracting with specialized lawyers.

impossible. In this sense, it is an efficient complement to the legal system of
copyright. In practice, the United States courts use the transaction cost

Fair use and exceptions to copyright
Although they operate in a centralized manner, collective copyright
management organizations result from the private initiative of creators, who
choose to use their copyrights in this way. By facilitating the diffusion of
works, they enable authors to draw a bigger profit, which also encourages
creation. Collective organizations of authors are not a universal solution,
however. They reduce some types of transaction costs, but do not eliminate
them. Transactions whose cost is higher than the profit cannot be realized,
which limits the diffusion of works to a sub-optimal level. This occurs when
consumers give a very low, but positive value to a work. In this case, they will
not be willing to meet the cost of a transaction with the copyright holder. The
diffusion of a work is also less likely if it depends on a large number of

Applying the fair use
doctrine (based on Depoorter

costs are too high, they block

and Parisi [2002])

consider the effect of copies on the

transactions. This is why the courts
potential market and on the value

Two judicial rulings in the

of the protected work. If transaction

United States illustrate the way in

costs are low, pirate users could

which the courts cite the work of

just as easily buy the originals.

Ronald Coase to determine the

Pirate copies thus have a negative

applicability of the fair use doctrine.

impact on the potential market of

The 1991 Nobel laureate in econo-

the originals and reduce the value

mics stated that when transaction

of the protected work. Therefore,
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the fair use doctrine does not apply

through an institution established

here. Conversely, if the transaction

for that purpose. The existence of a

costs are so high that the work

legal system of access to copied

cannot be diffused by the market,

creations was therefore decisive. In

the production of copies is not

Princeton University Press v.

prejudicial to the author, and fair

Michigan

use rights are applicable.

(1997), Princeton University Press,

Document

Service

In the following two cases,

Macmillan, and St. Martin's Press

the copies could have been obtained

sued a student-run "copy shop"

legally. Since they were not, they

that compiled "coursepacks" for

harmed

the

students consisting of photocopies

originals. In American Geophysical

the

authors

of

of materials provided by university

Union v. Texaco Inc (1995), a group

professors. The defendants claimed

of scientific publishers sued

fair use, but court found against

Texaco's Research Department for

them because the university

photocopying articles from scienti-

publishers operated departments

fic journals without permission.

that process requests for permis-

The court found in favor of the

sion to copy copyrighted works, i.e.

plaintiffs because there was a legal

a form of market, which Michigan

procedure for obtaining permission

Document Service had chosen to

for copies and paying royalties

ignore.

Digital works
The emergence and expansion of information and communication
technologies have radically changed the conditions under which literary and
artistic works are created and diffused. New and old creations can now be
digitized and diffused very easily. An opera by Mozart can be distributed and
reproduced on a CD or exchanged over the Internet as a MP3 file. There is a
need to strike a new balance between incentive and access in the copyright
system.
A digital "revolution"
Digital technology has revolutionized literary and artistic creation, not
only by giving rise to new forms of creation, but also by providing a new
medium for existing works. Almost all the forms of expression protected by
copyright can be digitized. And there are a large number of available formats
for working on the digital versions of a text. An image can be scanned, then
stored and diffused in Gif or JPEG format. Similar standards exist for video
(MPEG) and audio documents (MP3, WMA). In addition to new modes of
diffusion, these media are generating new forms of creation within the
copyright system. For example, some filmmakers are now choosing to work
with digital cameras. Digital media are extending the limits of copyrightable

explanation to determine the applicability of the doctrine.
Whether applied to a publishing contract, collective copyright

material by creating new forms of expression, such as computer graphics,
electronic music, website design and computer programming.

management organizations or copyright exemptions, the analysis of

What are the economic consequences of this revolution? At next to no

transactions reveals an important allocative function of copyright and, more

cost, digital versions of works can be copied identically, with no loss in

generally, of the legal system based on it. This function is at once distinct from

quality. Moreover, the range of technologies used to store and transmit

and complementary to the incentive function of intellectual property.

information-diskettes, CDs, DVDs and computer networks-allows for

Considering both together reveals the sophistication of a tried and tested legal

potentially infinite horizontal and vertical reproduction of digital works. In

system that covers a wide variety of works. The copyright system has

theory, a single original is sufficient to produce and diffuse as many copies as

constantly adjusted to new types of creations as they have emerged. However,

required. The only physical obstacle to piracy becomes the cost of identifying

the major change to information brought by digital technology marks an

and contacting users interested in a copy [Shy, 2000]. Indeed, piracy is seen

unprecedented challenge to copyright.

as a major problem by authors and publishers of copyrighted digital goods.
According to the 2002 Business Software Alliance survey conducted in 85
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countries, the rate of software piracy _ measured as the percentage of
unlicensed software installed over that year _ was 40 percent in 2001,
causing losses of around $11 billion. Similarly, the MP3 format, which is used
to digitize, compress and exchange music files over the Internet, is considered
a serious threat by the music industry. By facilitating the diffusion of works at
the expense of the authors' capacity to derive a profit from them, information
technologies are upsetting the incentive/access balance struck by copyright.

Napster and its successors
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complaints against these new

technology to charge for its services

file-swapping systems in 2001.

and counter piracy. New types of

A negotiated solution might

services are developing, such as

involve digital rights management

monthly subscription services that

(DRM) technology. The company

offer customers unlimited access to

that owns the Morpheus audio and

a catalog of music, and pay-per-

video file-swapping service agreed

download services like iTunes'

in March 2002 to use DRM

99-cents-per-song deal.

to pay damages, Napster, with its
23 million registered users, was

Digital technology also considerably extends the legal reach of

Created in 1987 by the

taken over by Bertelsmann Music

copyright. By definition, copyright is primarily concerned with protecting the

Fraunhofer Institut, the MP3

Group in November 2000, to

expression of works, and therefore with controlling copies. However, every

format

develop a secure, fee-based version

time a digital document is accessed, a copy is stored on the computer's

of its music distribution system.

memory. The frequency of technical copies, in particular over the Internet,

makes

it

possible

to

compress audio files at a high ratio,
while preserving near CD quality.

of

gives the author a right over every single use of the digital versions of his

This technology, combined with

Napster did not stop the exchange

work. Unlike a book, the digital version of a work will therefore never have

the increase in Internet speed,

of MP3 files from taking off again,

any independence from copyright. Once a book has been bought, it can be lent

opened the way for the online

however. Napster's legal weakness

or given to another user legally. This is not so for a software program bought

exchange of music files. In 1999, an

was its centralized file-swapping

under a single-user license. Thus, from a strictly legal point of view,

American student called Shawn

system, which kept lists of files

information technologies strengthen the legal monopoly conferred by

Fanning

exchanged

company's

copyright. This second upset in the tradeoff between creation and use, in

software program he designed

server. Napster's successors, inclu-

favor of creation this time, is far from being purely theoretical. Authors can

initially to swap MP3 files with his

ding

and

use technology to protect the digital versions of their works [Lessig, 2002],

friends. It was an overnight

Gnutella, avoided that problem by

namely encryption, on which digital rights management (DRM) is based.

success. By April 2000, up to

using peer-to-peer technologies

Encryption technology can be used to drastically limit the number of copies

700,000 users were logged on to

that link users directly to each

and to track the use of files downloaded from the Internet. In this case, the

Napster.

companies,

other, without going through a

second imbalance prevails: diffusion is strictly controlled by the copyright

represented by the Recording

fixed server. These firms simply

owner, with the result that deadweight loss increases in line with its

Industry Association of America

distribute a software program, with

monopoly power.

(RIAA), were swift to file a com-

advertisements from which they

Depending on the technical resources available to copyright owners

plaint against Napster for copy-

derive their revenues. They have no

and pirates, information technologies tip the creation-diffusion balance that

right violation. Rap artist Dr. Dre

means of controlling the nature of

justifies copyright in one or other direction. The problem is then to adapt it to

and rock group Metallica also sued

the files exchanged. The record and

digital works. For example, the European Copyright Directive of May 22,

for piracy in April 2000. Ordered

movie industries nevertheless filed

2001 excludes technical copies stored in computer memories from the scope

launched

Record

Napster,

a

The

neutralization

on

Kazaa,

the

MusicCity

78

The Economics of Patents and Copyright

IV/Economic Analysis of Copyright

of copyright. In the United States, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) of October 12, 1998 explicitly prohibits the circumvention of
technology-based protection against piracy. More generally, both laws
endeavor to determine which types of diffusion are exempt from copyright.
Exemption for educational purposes, already provided for by the fair use rule,
is for example reaffirmed. The DMCA also establishes that Internet service
providers are not responsible for copyright violations relating to documents
that transit via their services. These provisions, far from comprehensive, will
need to be clarified and expanded by case law. Efforts must also be made to
achieve international consistency, considering that these are borderless

longer the owner of his creation, is

his reputation or honor. He also

unusual for literary and artistic

has no "right to rescind" to block

intellectual property, but is integral

the commercialization of his work.

to patent law. Moreover, software

Lastly, the intellectual property of

copyrights, unlike other copyrights,

software makes allowances for

are stripped of some moral rights.

copying. The number of authorized

For example, a software author

private reproductions is limited to

cannot object to the modification of

a single backup copy, unless copying

his work if it is used for its intended

enhances the software's compatibi-

purpose unless this is prejudicial to

lity with other applications.

technologies.
To what extent does the tradeoff between incentive and access apply to

Software

software? The high rate of piracy that software publishers complain of seems
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Among the digital works protected by copyright, software is in a
category of its own. Copyright protection for software has less to do with the
literary or artistic nature of software than with the malleability of copyright.
Given the need to develop an intellectual property right for software,
legislators preferred to apply copyright to the "text" of computer programs
rather than to create a new right or to use patent law. To adapt copyright to
software, some rules were changed or dropped. Is it an appropriate type of
intellectual property? It seems rather to offer default protection, which
software developers can claim by complementing it with technology-based
protection or trade secrecy, or abandon if this is to their advantage.

a key factor in that tradeoff. But the diffusion of copied software can also be
beneficial for copyright owners. The commercialization of software often
depends on indirect appropriability. This mode of diffusion allows the author
to derive profit from the production of copies by third parties. It hinges on the
ability to practice price discrimination between ordinary customers and
pirate-customers. For example, this mechanism justifies charging higher
prices to companies than to individuals for software licenses. A company will
thus agree to pay more for a piece of software if its employees can copy and
use the program at home outside office hours [Shy, 2000]. In this case,
copyright serves to manage, rather than prevent, the production of copies.
The rights owner can also profit from piracy if the software enjoys
network effects. These exist when the software users benefit from other

Software protection in
France: between copyright
and patent

interpreted so strictly that it

people using the same software. The higher total number of users, the higher

resembles the novelty requirement

the individual value of the software. A word processor, for example, is far less

for patents. Furthermore, the law

useful if the documents produced on it cannot be transferred to other

stipulates that software developed

computers on which the same software has been installed. Likewise, there is

within

an

not much point in creating a digital image or animation if no one else has the

tected by a hybrid form of copy-

employment contract belongs to

software to view it. This need for compatibility, expressed by the consumers

right, which in many respects is

the employer, unless the contract

of some software, is an incentive for developers not to protect their creations.

similar to patent law. For example,

specifies otherwise. This rule,

The ability to diffuse copies of software freely will undoubtedly turn some

the criterion of originality is

according to which the author is no

customers into pirates, but it will also increase the price at which the

In France, software is pro-

the

framework

of
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remaining customers will be willing to buy the software. If the proportion of
customers engaging in piracy is not too high _ schools or companies, for
example, are less inclined to piracy _ the positive effect will prevail. This is
why, in the 1990s, technology-based protection of software was gradually
reduced, and even removed in the case of word processors and spreadsheets
[Shy, 2000]. Protected by a hybrid copyright, software is also distinguished
from other digital creations insofar as it is not always to the publisher's
advantage to enforce protection.
Whether applied to classics or the latest digital creations, economic
analysis reveals the originality of copyright in comparison to other
intellectual property rights. Designed initially to encourage creators by

V/Intellectual Property and
Competition Law

protecting them against literal copying, copyright plays a key role in the
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organization of the media and entertainment industries. The trend towards

Economists are increasingly critical of intellectual property. Until now

stronger copyright protection, through the extension of its duration, its

they were only skeptical of patents' supposedly favorable effect on innovation,

expansion to derivative works and its application to digital technology,

given scant empirical evidence that patents spur an increase in R&D. Now

enhances both this linchpin role and the market power it confers. It remains

they fear that stronger patent rights will actually impede innovation. The

to be seen whether stronger copyright encourages creation for greater social

same criticism is made of copyright. Control of derivative rights and

welfare. The tragedy of the anticommons resulting from a multiplication of

extension over time of copyright eventually stifles creation [Lessig, 2002].

rights on derivative works and from technological barriers to private copying

Initially intended as an incentive instrument, intellectual property now seems

suggests prudence on this issue.

to be a factor of distortion: encouraging monopoly rent-seeking to the
detriment of consumers, blocking competitors, etc. To counter these effects,
some call competition policy to the rescue. Is it a remedy for the abuses and
excesses of intellectual property law?

The relationship between intellectual property
and competition law
At first sight, the two bodies of law appear to be at cross-purposes.
Intellectual property law grants monopolies, whereas competition law seeks
to break them up. This perception prevailed in the United States and Europe
until the late 1960s [Tom and Newberg, 1997]. Today the two bodies of law
are seen as complementary instruments, which must be balanced against
each other. A legal system that overprotects intellectual property and
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underenforces antitrust law poses dangers to competition and ultimately to

confer a monopoly. However, a patent does give monopoly power if the new

innovation, just as one that underprotects intellectual property and

product or process has characteristics that give it an advantage over others.

overenforces antitrust principles can also harm incentives to innovate

Because of these characteristics, it will only be in competition with imperfect

[Pitofsky, 2001].

substitutes.
Since intellectual property does not confer a monopoly in a market

A closer look at competition law

ipso facto, the competition authorities need to establish two facts to find
against a company: first that the patent or copyright bestows or is associated

The view that intellectual property law and competition law are in
conflict is based on two erroneous simplifications. One is that competition

with the company's dominant position; and further that the company abuses
that position. This approach is illustrated by the Magill case.

law prohibits monopolies, and the other that intellectual property rights
automatically bestow a monopoly.
Antitrust law protects competition by preventing behavior that
hampers market forces. For example, it prohibits price fixing and partitioning

83

of the market by a group of producers. As a general rule, antitrust law does
not punish monopoly power per se, but the abuse of that power, which is

Magill or abuse of a
copyright to preserve a
monopoly
in
weekly
television guides

something quite different. Competition law recognizes a company's right to

which in 1988 ruled that the refusal
to license in this case amounted to
abuse of a dominant position. The
Commission ordered the three
broadcasters to "[supply] third

enjoy a monopoly that it has acquired by merit. Its role is not to penalize a

In the 1980s, three televi-

parties on request and on a nondis-

company that has gained an advantage over its rivals by producing at a lower

sion broadcasters, including the

criminatory basis with their indivi-

cost or by offering higher-quality products to consumers. However, a

BBC, operated in Ireland. Each

dual advance weekly program lis-

company will be penalized if, in order to preserve and extend its monopoly

company published a weekly guide

tings and [permit] reproduction of

position, it practices predatory pricing or enters into exclusive contracts to

of its own programs, the listings of

those listings by such parties." The

close the market. Let's take the example of Microsoft. The Antitrust Division

which were covered by copyright.

Commission's decision was upheld

of the U.S. Justice Department did not take exception to the monopoly of

Each channel also licensed free of

by the Luxembourg Court of

Windows or Office. Rather, Bill Gates' corporation was found to be at fault for

charge advance information about

Justice in 1995. The court held that

seeking to maintain its dominant position through illegal practices,

their programming schedule to

mere ownership of an intellectual

particularly license contracts.

newspapers. Magill, a publishing

property right did not confer a

European jurisprudence [ECJ, 1971] and U.S. legislation [DoJ and

company, attempted to publish a

dominant position. However, the

FTC, 1995] clearly state that they do not presume that ownership of a patent

magazine

court

or copyright creates market power. Market power is recognized as the ability

programs and schedules of all three

television networks "had a de facto

to raise the price profitably above the competitive price. This is only possible

channels. The television companies

monopoly over the information

when no substitutes exist. However, in the eyes of consumers, just because a

claimed that this was an infringe-

used to compile listings for

product is protected does not mean there is no alternative. To take just one

ment of their copyright and

television programs, which put

example, most detective novels are covered by copyright. But no one can

obtained an injunction preventing

them in a position to prevent

seriously claim that any one book has a monopoly over the market. As for

the publication. Magill took the

effective competition on the market

patents, most are left idle and never used commercially; they therefore do not

case to the European Commission,

in weekly television guides." It

that

contained

the

found

that

the

three

84

The Economics of Patents and Copyright

added that there was no substitute

product, which they themselves did

for the information and that, by

not offer and for which there was

denying access to it, the broadcasters

potential consumer demand.

prevented the appearance of a new

V/Intellectual Property and Competition Law
The pre-eminence of competition law over intellectual property law
Competition authorities act ex post (except for merger control) and
patent offices ex ante. Competition authorities can therefore be tempted to
reverse decisions made by patent offices and to use competition law to correct

Complementary laws
From the point of view of efficiency, we observe a division of roles
between the two bodies of law. By according an exclusive right to inventions
and creations, intellectual property encourages innovation and therefore
dynamic efficiency. By eliminating the loss of consumer surplus associated
with monopolies, competition law favors static efficiency. It seeks above all to
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reestablish a lower price and a higher quantity offered on the market.
However, both laws strike a balance between short-run losses and
long-run gains in welfare. Intellectual property law provides for static

flaws in intellectual property protection. This approach was taken in 1972
against Xerox. The FTC took exception to the company's acquisition of a
"killer patent portfolio". This strategy involves piling up patents year after
year in order to push back a product's entry into the public domain and block
competitors for longer.
The role of competition authorities thus seems to be to pare down the
scope and duration of intellectual property rights when these are excessive.
Patent holders can be compelled to grant licenses or to make the terms of
licenses more favorable to licensees. Competition law thus appears to take
pre-eminence over intellectual property, fine-tuning the scope of rights.

efficiency by limiting the duration of protection. If the sole purpose of patents
and copyrights were to encourage innovation, they would have an infinite life,

FTC v. Xerox

licensing of all of Xerox's patents.
Xerox was one of the great

because that is the condition that maximizes the private revenues of inventors
and creators. Competition law also achieves a balance between static and

In 1972, the United States

technological triumphs of the 20th

dynamic efficiency, but it is less visible because the cut-off point between

Federal Trade Commission (FTC),

century. It was a major innovation.

short-term and long-term effects is not set by law. Let's take the example of

initiated action against Xerox for

It was a very difficult innovation

merger control. Mergers must be approved by the competition authorities. A

restrictive commercial practices

and they carried it off brilliantly.

transaction will be prohibited if it has an anticompetitive effect that

and monopolizing the market in

Why should one intervene in such a

disadvantages consumers. The competition authorities nevertheless take the

photocopying machines. Central to

situation? Why should one tamper

positive effects of concentration into account and weigh them up against its

the dispute was the extension over

with their patent rights? They had

negative anticompetitive effect. The authorities consider cost reductions,

time of Xerox's monopoly through

somewhere between 1,000 and

such as those generated by economies of scale, and dynamic gains achieved

an accumulation of patents.

2,000 patents in the mid-1970s.

by better organization or better R&D financing. U.S. competition law takes

Michael Scherer was chief

They were adding to their portfolio

into account both the immediate and over-time gains of a merger. However,

economist at the FTC at the time.

at a rate of several hundred patents

the latter are given a fairly low weighting because they are approximate and

He describes the case as follows

a year. They had the technology

difficult to forecast.

[Anderson and Gallini, 1998]:

completely encircled, and a

Both laws thus ensure a balance between dynamic and static

"I was never so scared about

consideration that prompted our

efficiency, but with a different emphasis. Intellectual property law is slanted

anything in my life as accepting a

decision to intervene with compul-

toward dynamic efficiency, while competition law stresses static efficiency.

decree providing for compulsory

sory licensing was that the 914

86

The Economics of Patents and Copyright

Comments on computerrelated patents from the
FTC [FTC's comments, 1995]

Copier was introduced in 1959. The

case was, frankly, social enginee-

case came for a decision in 1975.

ring. It was time to break open this

They had enjoyed 16 years of a

monopoly and create competition.

spectacular patent monopoly. How

It was a task that was going to be

long should a monopoly last? We

very difficult to achieve just

In response to a paper from

approaches, both the producers of

intervened because we thought

through the market, without

the Patent and Trademark Office

current products and would-be

essentially that 17 years was what

intervention, and that was the

(PTO) on the patentability of

innovators may find it very difficult

the law had in mind, 17 years was

essential rationale."

software,

to

enough. […] But the essence of the

Most economists do not recommend this kind of fine-tuning, because
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of the confusing message it sends to inventors and creators. If they do not

patent is inappropriately granted to
software that is already part of the
prior art and has become embodied
in existing products, interfaces and

the

Federal

Trade

devise

alternate

technical

Commission urged the PTO to

solutions acceptable to the market-

exercise caution in drafting new

place."

guidelines for examining patent

The FTC recommended that

applications for computer-related

the PTO reconsider any changes to

inventions.

the guidelines that would have the

know in advance whether their rights will be whittled down or upheld by

The FTC pointed out that

effect of easing the subject matter

competition authorities, they cannot correctly estimate the return on their

"inappropriate or overbroad grants

test, since this would require

investment. This heightened legal insecurity reduces incentives and,

of intellectual property rights may

greater reliance on the novelty and

consequently, R&D efforts. Moreover, competition law is not equipped to set

interfere with the competition that

nonobviousness tests, which the

the right level of innovation. Competition authorities do not have the

often drives innovation." It added

PTO itself has recognized do not

scientific and technical expertise to evaluate whether a particular intellectual

that their negative effects on

currently function as well in

property right is too broad or too long. In fact, neither competition authorities

innovation "can be heightened by

software as they do in other areas.

nor patent offices have the knowledge required to determine optimal patent

strong network effects [and] if a

scope, but of the two, the patent offices seem to be in a better position to make
trade-offs between incentives for first as opposed to subsequent innovators
[OECD, 2001].
Therefore, it is preferable to reform intellectual property law rather
than to employ competition law to reduce the flaws and excesses of

The application of competition policy to
license agreements

intellectual property protection. Antitrust authorities have a role to play in
this, of course. As the advocates of competition, they can inform intellectual

Between 1996 and 2000, the European competition authority

property policy choices by pointing out the effects of various reforms. For

examined 140 cases of anticompetitive practices relating to intellectual

example, the Federal Trade Commission highlighted the dangers of broad

property rights [EC, 2001]. These decisions accounted for 7% of the

patents in the field of information technology in the mid-1990s.

Commission's work on competition. A little over half of the cases processed
concerned patents and around a quarter concerned copyright. Eight cases out
of ten were related to licensing.
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Economic aspects
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The effects of exclusive vertical licenses

Economic analysis offers a valuable guide for appraising the

In the first of the four cases (top left of the diagram) a technology

anticompetitive effects of license agreements. The economic method is based

company develops an innovation and licenses it to a manufacturer. The

on two key questions. Do the licensor and licensee enjoy a monopoly power

technology firm has a broad patent that gives it market power. The

in their markets? Are their products complements or substitutes?

manufacturer combines the license with other inputs to produce a marketable

Firstly, it is useful to recall a few definitions. Monopoly power refers to

product. This is a very common situation because intellectual property is

the ability to raise the price profitably. It is generally greater when the

rarely a good that can be consumed without having been combined with other

number of companies in the market is small and the product is hard to
substitute. A substitute is a product that enjoys increased demand when the

factors. It is typically combined with other complementary goods, which may
be tangible _ in particular manufacturing equipment-or intangible _ for

price of the other product goes up. This is the case of Pepsi and Coca Cola.

example other intellectual property rights. The manufacturer does not have a

Conversely, a complement is a product that enjoys increased demand when

monopoly power in its market. Therefore the license agreement will not

the price of the other product goes down. This is the case of ski bindings and

generate additional anticompetitive effects, and will even be beneficial for

sticks, demand for which rises when the price of skis falls. Based on those

consumers.

concepts, economic analysis makes a distinction between the four cases

What would happen if there were no license at all? To exploit its

shown in the diagram. These cases illustrate a simple situation: an exclusive

market power, the holder of the intellectual property right would have to

unilateral license between an inventor or creator (I) and a licensee (L). The

develop the complementary business itself. In terms of anticompetitive

benchmark situation, against which the competition authorities evaluate the

effects, there would be no difference between no license and an exclusive

effects of license agreements, is no license.

license. In both cases, downstream companies would be denied access to the
new technology. The rights holder would extract its monopoly rent directly

The effects of licensing, depending on the market
power and the horizontal or vertical nature
of the relationship between licensor and licensee

from the final consumers, instead of receiving it indirectly from the
manufacturer through license fees. However, the solution of integration can
be less efficient than a license contract, because it does not allow the parties
to take advantage of a division of labor to reduce costs. It is inefficient for the

I

I

owner of the intellectual property to produce the item itself because it lacks
the necessary competencies and know-how to enter the downstream industry.

L
Unlikely anticompetitive effect

I

L

And, unless it has sufficient output, it will also fail to take advantage of

Beneficial effect for consumers

I

L

agreements, the public authority generally hold the view that licensing
intellectual property increases welfare [DoJ and FTC, 1995, OECD, 2001].
Competition authorities nevertheless examine these agreements
individually for any abusive clauses they might contain. With licenses, the

L
No anticompetitive effect

economies of scale. Given the predominance and efficiency of vertical license

devil's in the detail. Anticompetitive effects stem from the clauses that set out
Likely anticompetitive effect

the precise undertakings and obligations of licensor and licensee, which can
be used to restrict competition. In the United States, the courts found against
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Microsoft because of the multiple restrictions on computer manufacturers

merged company. If the licensor and licensee have market power and are in a

that it included in the Windows license. Manufacturers were not permitted to
preinstall browsers other than Internet Explorer and were required to display

vertical relationship, the license is therefore beneficial for consumers.
In the third case _ bottom left of the diagram _ the granting of a

its icon on the screen. Two examples of restrictions included a requirement

license never has an anticompetitive effect. Here, the intellectual property

for licensees to pay royalties on a second technology that was no longer

right is narrow. The licensor and licensee both have many competitors and do

protected and a prohibition on licensees challenging the validity of the

not enjoy market power. Owing to competitive pressure, the royalty is

licensor's patents. In these case-by-case examinations, the competition

therefore equal to marginal cost. The license only allows the technology

authorities ask three questions. Does the license contain a clause that creates
a situation that is more anticompetitive than if there were no license at all? Is

company to cover its annual fees to the patent office. In this case, a vertical
license between companies manufacturing complementary products _ or

this clause essential to the benefit that the license brings? If the answer is yes

even a horizontal license between competitors _ cannot be unfavorable to

to both these questions, does the benefit of the license outweigh the loss

consumers. For this reason, the U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of

induced by the reduction in competition? The authorities thus weigh up the

Intellectual Property [DoJ and FTC, 1995] explicitly authorize licenses

negative and positive effects.

between competitors whose market share does not exceed 20%.
By contrast, a license agreement between competitors becomes

Other cases

problematic when the firms involved do enjoy market power. This is the last
case, shown on the bottom right of the diagram. In this case, licensing

In the second case _ top right of the diagram _ there is a vertical

strengthens dominant positions. The market will be slightly less competitive.

license between two firms that both enjoy market power. The license benefits
both consumers and the firms, in addition to achieving a gain in efficiency

License contracts can thus be an opportunity for firms to agree on clauses that
limit competition _ for example that restrict the licensee's commercial

through a division of labor. The French economist Antoine Augustin Cournot

activity, or that set a minimum price. The exchange of technology thus forms

[1838] once quipped that the only thing worse than a monopoly is a chain of

the basis of a broader agreement designed to support collusion [Lin, 1997]. A

monopolies. Cournot demonstrated that a merger between two companies

cross licensing contract, i.e., an agreement under which each party grants a

producing complementary goods generates both a higher joint profit and a

license to the other, also provides competitors with a golden opportunity to

lower price for final consumers. This observation makes sense if we consider

operate like a cartel, by sharing the market or fixing prices. They might agree,

that a lack of coordination between the two monopolies would prompt each

for example, on the price to charge consumers, as in FTC v. Summit

to apply a margin without taking account of the negative effect on the other

Technology and VISX. Or they might set excessively high royalties, which

company. Since the goods are complementary, an increase in the price of one

compensate each other out for the firms involved, but which are passed on to

causes a decrease in demand for the other and therefore a lower profit for the

consumers [Fershtman and Kamien, 1992]. A horizontal licensing agreement,

company that makes it. When the two companies merge, this double margin

whether a cross license or not, on blocking patents, can also be a major

problem disappears. The effect of an increase (or a decrease) in price is

barrier to the entry of new competitors. For example, new entrants in the

integrated into the calculation of the joint profit. From an analytical point of

semiconductor industry need to spend $100-$200 million of revenues to

view, granting a license can play the same role as a merger. If the fee set by

license what are now considered basic manufacturing principles but which do

the license contract contains a fixed amount equal to the licensee's monopoly

not transfer any currently useful technologies [Hall and Ziedonis, 2001]. In

surplus and a variable amount for each product sold equal to its marginal

other cases, it is the absence of a license agreement that can put newcomers

cost, the price on the downstream market will be equivalent to that of the

at a technological disadvantage in relation to established firms [Rockett,
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FTC v. Summit
Technology and VISX

not been a license, the two firms
would be competing with each
other. The firms argued that the
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In 1998, the FTC took action

patent pool was a way of settling

against two firms that produce the

their intellectual property dispute.

laser equipment used in photore-

The FTC retorted that litigation

fractive keratectomy, a form of eye

could have been avoided by far less

surgery

correct

restrictive means, such as ordinary

vision. Summit and VISX each have

or cross licenses that did not

a patent protecting a different tech-

dictate the price of their equipment

nology, which they pooled. The

to users. An arrangement was

firms charged doctors a fee of $250

finally found in 1999 between the

for every operation performed with

FTC and the two firms, which

either a Summit or VISX laser. The

agreed to dissolve their partnership.

performed

to

FTC considered that if there had

V/Intellectual Property and Competition Law
In the Magill case, the decision to impose compulsory licensing was
justified by a combination of exceptional circumstances. Firstly, there were
no substitutes. It was not possible to publish a television guide without the
broadcasters' program listings; and the broadcasters were the only source of
that information. Secondly, by refusing to license, the channels had reserved
to themselves the secondary market in weekly television guides. The refusal
to grant access to the listings precluded all competition. Lastly, there was no
merit in having the information. The information on program times and
content was simply a sub-product of the networks' broadcasting activity.
Compulsory licensing therefore did not affect the incentives to produce that
information. These circumstances explain why Magill did not open the gates
to a series of decisions imposing compulsory licenses. At the time, however,
the judgment of the Luxembourg Court of Justice raised fears among
observers that patent holders in Europe would be compelled to grant licenses
to secondary innovators.
Since Magill, the European Commission has only ordered compulsory
licensing in one other case-and only as an interim measure. At issue was the

1990].
Compulsory licensing and refusal to license
Having seen the conditions under which licenses are granted, let's take
a look at the circumstances in which competition authorities can impose
compulsory licensing on patent holders. The Xerox and Magill cases
mentioned previously are useful examples here.
The FTC's 1972 decision compelling the photocopier manufacturer to
license its patents would not be made today. Recent U.S. jurisprudence has
granted a kind of antitrust immunity to intellectual property [Pitofsky, 2001].
The precedent was set in 2000 by a case involving Xerox again, this time
against a group of independent companies that service and maintain
photocopiers and printers. The plaintiffs challenged Xerox's refusal to sell or
license parts and software to them, on the grounds that it prevented them
from competing with Xerox's own after-sales services. The Federal Circuit
dismissed their claim, indicating in its ruling that only a small number of
restrictive conditions can be invoked to overturn a refusal to license (see inset
on the essential facilities doctrine).

segmentation of the German pharmaceutical market into a 1,860-zone
structure based on postal codes, protected by copyright law. U.S. firm IMS,
world leader in pharmaceutical market information, refused to grant a license
to enable its competitor, NDC, to use the segmentation structure. In its
decision, the Commission followed precedents by seeking to establish
exceptional circumstances, which allowed it to assimilate the refusal to
license to abuse of a dominant position. It ruled that the refusal effectively
prevented the entry of any rival on the German market. The Commission
found that there was no substitute for this standard for the provision of
reports detailing regional sales data on drug purchases and prescriptions. It
also stressed that the standard was developed by the German pharmaceutical
industry.
The common feature of the Magill and IMS decisions is that they are
based on the essential facilities doctrine, which confirms that competition law
puts intellectual property on a par with other forms of property and only
deems a refusal to license illegal in exceptional circumstances.
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Application of the
essential facilities doctrine
to intellectual property
rights

potential competitors. Thirdly, the
in the market, inasmuch as there is
no actual or potential substitute.
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essential

facilities

facilities

doctrine is rarely invoked to open

in

U.S.

access to a resource, whether

antitrust law. It developed in

tangible or not. The difficulty of its

Europe

mid-1980s

application lies in the fact that

onwards. The term "essential

enforcing access amounts to

facility" was first used by the

expropriating a monopoly that was

European Commission in the 1992

acquired legitimately (if this were

decision

B&I

not the case, it would be sufficient

Line/Stena-Sealink case. On both

to challenge a monopoly position

sides of the Atlantic, the doctrine is

created by undue means). But

based on the same premise: when

competition law, also concerned

access to a resource is essential to

with dynamic efficiency, is not

operate in a market, the owner of

designed to eliminate monopolies

the facility can, in certain circum-

acquired by merit.

doctrine

essential
originated

from

taken

the

in

the

stances, be compelled to guarantee

In the United States, the

it to operators. Monopoly infra-

essential facilities doctrine is not

structures such as the electricity

applied to intellectual property.

grid or the local telephone loop are

Only three far more restrictive

prime examples.

conditions can lift the antitrust

In Europe, three principle

immunity bestowed by exclusive

conditions must be met to demons-

use of a patent: (i) the patent was

trate that a denial of access to

obtained fraudulently (ii), the

resources infringes competition

litigation is a sham to cover the

law. Firstly, there must be no

implementation of an anticompeti-

objective reasons justifying the

tive arrangement (iii) the patent is

refusal, for example safety in the

employed in a tying strategy to

case of connection to the electricity

extend market power beyond the

grid. Secondly, the denial of access

scope of the patent.

must be likely to eliminate all

Cross licenses and patent pools

facility must be essential to operate

The
The

V/Intellectual Property and Competition Law

Some exchanges of licenses combine the intellectual property of
several rights holders. These can be divided into two categories: cross licenses
and patent pools. In a cross licensing arrangement, two creators-rarely morereciprocally authorize use of each other's innovations. These licenses usually
involve competing companies, as in the agreement between Summit
Technology and VISX. In patent pools, many innovators pool their
intellectual property rights and offer a package license to users.
We saw earlier how a licensing agreement between two companies in
a horizontal relationship can cause an anticompetitive effect, in the form of
collusion or a barrier to the entry of new competitors. Cross licensing
therefore entails a risk of static inefficiency. It can, however, offer a benefit
that offsets or exceeds that effect. Let us take the example of two blocking
patents. The first patent is broad and dominates a narrow patent that
improves on the first invention. The holder of the narrow patent cannot use
its invention without a license from the holder of the broad patent; likewise,
the holder of the broad patent cannot benefit from the improvement. A cross
licensing agreement offers a way out of this double bind. From the point of
view of the general interest, it improves productive efficiency. It also avoids
the litigation costs that would inevitably ensue if each owner decided to
market its product regardless. In practice, cross-licensing agreements are
often a way of settling property disputes.
However, cross licensing is not always an ex post arrangement to
exchange technologies or settle a dispute. It is also used to forestall hold-up,
particularly in sectors characterized by rapid technological progress. In these
industries, such as semiconductors, the primary inventor cannot be sure of
maintaining his lead in R&D, because others are in a position to improve on
his innovation. Furthermore, he cannot foresee future infringements of his
intellectual property rights. These are innovations that have not yet been
developed or patent applications that have not yet been examined. As
Frederic Scherer pointed out [1995], companies "are essentially finding
themselves in a minefield: there are lots of unexploded patents out there, and
you might step on one and have your corporate leg blown off." By agreeing to
a reciprocal exchange of licenses to come on technologies and improvements
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that have not yet been patented, innovators guard against the risk of not being
able to use their inventions or being sued. By reducing the risk of being held
to ransom, these types of agreement restore incentives to invest in R&D and
are therefore favorable to the general interest.
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V/Intellectual Property and Competition Law

The MPEG-2 patent pool

selects new essential patents as the
technology evolves. It is also

The

MPEG

technical

responsible for removing patents

standard (or more accurately,

that have become nonessential.

Patent pooling expands the system of cross licensing to a larger

MPEG-2 because it is a second

The "essentiality" of a patent,

number of parties. The first documented example of this type of agreement

version) is used to compress video

which

dates from 1856. It was an initiative by American sewing-machine

data. It has become the industry

should included in or excluded

manufacturers. Since then, almost 100 pools have been created and

standard for all devices that store

from the pool, is evaluated by

administered by the industry, 63 of them in the United States [Lerner et al.,

or transmit image data (televisions,

independent experts. The rights

2002]. Competition authorities have long been wary of these groupings

DVD players, etc.) and has been

holders receive income proportio-

because of their close resemblance to cartels. Gilbert [2002] has identified 22

incorporated into more than 300

nal to their share of patents in the

cases examined by U.S. courts that mark a change in jurisprudence. The most

million machines. This figure can

pool. At end-2002, the pool

recent concern digital technologies, such as the Moving Pictures Expert

be expected to increase six-fold by

contained 525 essential patents,

Group (MPEG) standard, created by eight companies that have pooled some

2006 and the estimated value of

which is five times more than at the

100 patents.

products

MPEG-2

outset. They belong to 22 compa-

The MPEG-2 pool only contains essential patents. These "by definition

standard will be more than $500

nies, i.e., almost triple the initial

have no substitutes; one needs licenses to each of them in order to comply

million by the same date [Futa,

number. MPEG-LA is also required

with the standard" [Klein, 1999]. The criterion of "essentiality" is

2002]. Apart from the University of

to sell the license on a nondiscrimi-

fundamental to a cost-benefit analysis of patent pools. Firstly, it implies that

Columbia, the owners of the

natory

the licenses cover complementary patents, both in the technical and

patents in the pool are eight major

requests it. Every patent can also

electronics and telecommunica-

be licensed separately from the

tions companies, including Sony,

others. If, for example, a patent has

Lucent

They

another application outside of the

themselves use the standard they

standard, the user does not have to

developed. In addition, there are

buy all the patents in the pool,

almost 500 licensees.

including those for which he has no

economic sense. If the price of one of the licenses in the pool falls, demand for
the other licenses increases. Secondly, there must be no substitutes
whatsoever, i.e., the patents in the pool cannot be substituted either by each
other or by outside patents. The patents thus form a pool of monopolies.
Patent pooling is therefore an efficient response to the problem of multiple
margins. Cournot's theorem is relevant here: if the holders of essential
patents do not act in concert, the license for the patent package will be more
expensive and their profit will be lower. Other advantages add to this gain in
efficiency. The patent pool enables users to save on commercial expenses.
Instead of having to approach and negotiate with several parties to obtain the
patents necessary for the MPEG-2 standard, licensees only have to deal with

using

and

the

Mitsubishi.

determines

basis

to

whether

anyone

it

who

The MPEG-2 pool is a

use. The members of the pool also

model in terms of prevention of

agree to cross-sell their own licens-

anticompetitive effects. It only

es to each other separately. This

contains patents that are essential

independent licensing require-

to the compression technology, and

ment, imposed by the competition

every effort is made to reduce the

authorities, is a good way of

a single intermediary. In addition, patent pooling, like cross licensing, is a

number of patents in the pool.

ensuring that the patents in the

way of limiting intellectual property disputes for the companies in the pool. It

Management of the pool and

pool enhance welfare [Lerner and

prevents hold-up and reduces litigation costs. In sum, patent pooling

licensing are handled by a speciali-

Tirole, 2002].

eliminates the problem of multiple margins and reduces transaction costs.

zed agent, MPEG-LA. The agent
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Conclusion

On the advantages and disadvantages of licenses, particularly in terms
of their anticompetitive effects, we have seen in this section that economic
analysis takes a favorable view of licensing. It suggests that the granting of an
intellectual property right is usually in the general interest. It also provides
methodical considerations for examining situations on a case-by-case basis.
It should be stressed, however, that these considerations are based
necessarily on simplifications. One of these is the dichotomy between vertical
and horizontal relationships. This is key to evaluating the benefits of licenses,
but can be difficult to determine. Innovations are rarely pure substitutes or
pure complements. A patent may contain both complementary and

Conclusion

substitutable elements. Moreover, from a dynamic point of view, a
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complement may become a substitute. This is the case with operating systems

"No economist, on the basis of present knowledge, could possibly state

and Internet browsers. Netscape is a complement, not a substitute, for

with certainty that the patent system, as it now operates, confers a net benefit

Windows. However, many, including Microsoft, believe that this type of

or net loss upon society […] If we did not have a patent system, it would be

program could one day become middleware that could replace some

irresponsible [...] to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a

operating system functions.

patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our
present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it."
These statements were made in a study on patents commissioned by
the U.S. Congress in the late 1950s [Machlup, 1958]. Since then, new
empirical and theoretical knowledge has emerged. This book has described
and summarized these developments. Do they lead us to revise Machlup's
view?
Should intellectual property be abolished?
The current dispute over intellectual property began with the
extension of patents to biotechnology products, which raised fears of the
privatization of genetic inventions and the appropriation of the Southern
Hemisphere's genetic resources by corporations from rich countries. It
spread with the IT and Internet boom, which pitted supporters of freeware
and open architecture against proponents of proprietary products.
A similar anti-patent and anti-copyright movement arose in the
third quarter of the 19th century. It succeeded in abolishing patent laws
in the Netherlands for 40 years and almost eliminated protection for
inventions in Britain and Prussia.
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Anti-intellectual property
movements in the 19th
century (from Machlup
and Penrose [1950] and
Sagot-Duvauroux [2002])
Intellectual property protection laws were criticized by
American
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libertarians

in

Conclusion

1870s. A return to protectionism

property right. Léon Walras and

Dupuit, an engineer and economist

quashed the stirrings of reform: the

Jules Dupuit expressed more

and pioneer of infrastructure

British government returned to the

balanced viewpoints. Walras, the

pricing, regarded the allocation of a

status quo ante in 1874; the

father

equilibrium

temporary monopoly to be a

German empire adopted a law on

theory, considered that an author

second-best solution. He conside-

patents in 1877; and Switzerland

or inventor who makes his idea

red it as the least socially harmful

joined the fold by signing the Paris

known should be allowed by

way to stimulate innovation that

Convention in 1883.

society to exploit it as a monopoly

had been found, but that it was

of

general

the

Copyright endured similar

for a certain time; otherwise "it is

nevertheless

second half of the 19th century.

criticism. Many countries were

certain that the pursuit of scientific

"books and inventions are not des-

Benjamin Tucker, who translated

opposed to the extension of

theories,

of

troyed by use. Their use is unlimi-

Pierre-Joseph

into

copyright internationally. In the

industrial inventions, and the com-

ted, i.e., their use by some people

English, regarded patents and

United States, where for a long

position of works of art, while not

does not prevent their use by

copyrights

Proudhon
as

the

development

prejudicial,

since

undeserved

time copyright on foreign books

completely abandoned, would at

others, nor does today's use

privileges, regardless of whether

was not recognized [Plant, 1934],

least

prevent tomorrow's".

they were conferred by the state or

liberals such as Charles Henry

by a monarch [Merges, 1997].

Carey criticized Britain's monopoly

In Europe at the same time,

on book distribution. In 1868,

intellectual property protection

Britain decided not to abolish

was decried as an impediment to

copyright and instead set about

trade. Patent legislation was called

strengthening it in its colonies and

into question in many countries. In

other countries.

1868, Bismarck recommended its

Economists of the day

repeal in Prussia. A year later, the

participated actively in the public

Netherlands abolished patents. In

debate on intellectual property

1872, the House of Lords reformed

protection. In France, for example,

British patent law. Countries, such

the

as Switzerland, that had not yet

served as a forum for different

adopted laws to protect inventions

views. Abolitionists like Pierre-

decided not to introduce them.

Joseph Proudhon railed against the

However, the anti-patent move-

appropriation of ideas by copy-

ment was soon cut short by

right, while liberals led by Frédéric

economic recession in the early

Bastiat advocated a perpetual

Journal

des

Economistes

be

seriously

neglected".

The abolition or preservation of intellectual property protection is
thus not just a purely theoretical question. To decide on it from an economic
viewpoint, we must be able to assess all the consequences of protection and
determine whether the total favorable effects for society outweigh the total
negative effects. Unfortunately, this exercise is no more within our reach
today than it was in Machlup's day.
On the contrary, economic analysis has increased the complexity of
such an evaluation by bringing to light previously unsuspected costs and
benefits. Three major adverse effects have been identified by economists
since the mid-20th century: patent races, the cumulative nature of technical
and artistic progress, and the tragedy of the anticommons. Let us recapitulate
the basic principles of these three ideas. Firstly, the prospect of obtaining a
temporary monopoly encourages too many innovators to pursue the same
research projects. They enter a race to patent, which needlessly absorbs a
share of the available economic resources. Secondly, cumulativity refers to
the fact that creation and invention are based on the knowledge that precedes
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Conclusion

them. To make a new contribution, artists and researchers "stand on the

Great Gatsby. The extension of protection is also costly for creators. Many

shoulders" of their predecessors. Rewarding pioneers amounts to

books and films reuse old stories, documentaries include extracts from

discouraging secondary inventors and creators; conversely, favoring the latter

archived footage, and music remixes and transforms old tunes and songs. If

reduces the incentives of the former. Thirdly, in the tragedy of the

these elements continue to be protected, new creators must negotiate

anticommons, the fragmentation of intellectual property makes access to the

permission and royalties with the rights holders. They must also pay the costs

collective body of knowledge more difficult and more costly, by multiplying

of the search, which is all the more difficult and therefore expensive when a

the number of rights holders who must be contacted to obtain a license and
who must be paid royalties. We are a long way from the days when the English

work is old. Extension thus hampers creation. Does it stimulate it in other
ways? The answer is no. The benefits in terms of incentives to create _ and

economist Jeremy Bentham [1785] could defend intellectual property

therefore the production of additional literary and artistic works for society _

protection by arguing that it did not cost society anything.

are negligible. In the case of a work produced 30 years before the death of the

Among the recently discovered benefits, the most important is the role

author, with a constant annual flow of royalties and a discount rate of 7%, the

of intellectual property in facilitating trade. It was not until 1960 that

additional 20 years of protection will only generate a further 0.33% for the

economic analysis understood the origin of the friction that hampers

rights holders. Who could seriously assert that the 20-year extension will

transactions and how property rights can reduce this friction. Intellectual

spur new creative efforts?

property rights are no exception. They facilitate the exploitation of ideas and
creations by those who value them most.

Empirical studies on the consequences of strengthening and
extending intellectual property protection, particularly patents, suggest there
are no effects on investment. In the United States, for example, the increase

Overprotection ultimately stifles research and creation

in R&D spending cannot be ascribed to changes in intellectual property law
[Jaffe, 2000]. Stronger intellectual property protection has caused a rapid

Although economic analysis does not make it possible to make a

increase in the number of patents, but not in investment. According to

definitive judgment of intellectual property, it can point up the dangers of

surveys, entrepreneurs from outside the pharmaceuticals and biotechnology

excessive protection. Since the 1980s, intellectual property law has been

sectors perceive patents as only a secondary means to guarantee a return on

gradually strengthened and extended. This has led to a situation of

their investment in R&D. This does not prevent firms from systematically

overprotection, which now seems to be stifling more than stimulating

filing, since patent ownership reduces the risk of being blocked by a

innovation.

competitor and improves their bargaining power in negotiations over access

To recall a few illustrations of this trend: it has become increasingly

to technology or finance.

difficult, especially in the United States, to challenge patent validity

Thus, on the one side, theoretical analysis shows how the allocation of

successfully; patents have been extended to cover genes, software and

broad patents, the extension of patentability to previously excluded fields, the

business methods; and copyright duration has been extended by 20 years. A

extension of the duration of copyright, and the broadening of derivative rights

theoretical study of these developments shows that each generates numerous

can impede innovation; on the other, empirical studies highlight a lack of

negative effects for little or no benefit in terms of welfare. The extension of

incentive effects generated by stronger intellectual property protection. In

copyright is a good example. On the cost side, the decision by the U.S.

other words, the reforms undertaken since the 1980s have pushed the

Congress in 1999 deprives consumers of free access to works from the 1920s

intellectual property system towards overprotection, which is unfavorable to

to the 1940s. They will have to wait another 20 years before being able to buy

innovation.

Rhapsody in Blue in a less expensive compilation, or a cheap edition of The
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Conclusion
not been able to offer policymakers with a basis for choosing between "all or
nothing" where intellectual property protection is concerned, "it does provide

Unlike some of their 19th-century peers, today's economists do not
suggest throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Rather than arguing in

a sufficiently firm basis for decisions about 'a little more or a little less' of
various ingredients of the patent system." [Machlup, 1958].

favor of abolishing intellectual property protection, they focus on correcting
its shortcomings. Let us cite several ways to achieve this.
A first measure, in the field of copyright, would be to institute
compulsory registration subject to payment of an annual fee, however modest
[Lessig, 2002; Landes and Posner, 2002]. The aim is to reduce research costs
for the rights holders and to allow old works that are still protected to be
rediscovered and exploited. Such a measure would be a way of centralizing
information about rights holders, similar to a cadastral survey of real-estate
owners. As with patent renewal today, if the annual fee were not paid,
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protection would lapse before the legal expiration date. The advantage of this
system is that it would eliminate creations of no value.
A second measure would be to remove the factors that encourage
patent offices to lower their guard and approve applications carelessly. As the
United States precedent shows, examiners are influenced by numerous
counter incentives: patent offices earn money when examiners accept patents
and lose money when they reject applications; rejection of an application
entails additional work because, unlike an approval, it must be justified; and,
since opposition is by nature contrary to the interests of filers and their
lawyers, this can reduce an examiner's chances of finding employment with
one of the major law firms specialized in patents. There is therefore a need to
rebuild a system of incentives that realigns the interests of patent offices with
those of society in general, and not just with those of filers.
A third measure would be to set up a public fund, to be managed by
the competition authorities, which could be used to facilitate challenges to
some intellectual property rights [Gilbert, 2002]. The courts do not provide a
sufficiently efficient check on poor patent-grant decisions. Because of free
riding, parties are reluctant to take matters to court, or else the high costs of
litigation encourage parties to settle before the judgment. A public fund could
reverse this situation, by clearing the way for competition to blocking patents

A French version of this book has been published by Editions de La

of dubious validity.

Découverte (Paris) in 2003. The authors want to thank Madeleine Grieve for

As this book has demonstrated, although economic analysis still has

her translation.
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